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Electronic cigarettes pose a competitive threat to the makers of cigarettes
and other tobacco products, as well as to nicotine replacement herapies uch
as nicotine gum and patches. A common response to such a threat is support
for government regulation to suppress competition. Predictably, cigarette
manufacturers and other threatened producers, as well as the governments that
earn revenue from tobacco taxes, are supporting greater regulation of
electronic cigarettes that would replicate the cartel-supporting rules of the
Master Settlement Agreement. These efforts are aided by anti-smoking
organizations that would like to prevent the growth of demand for electronic
cigarettes. This episode allows application of the Bootlegger and Baptist theory
of regulation. Groups with divergent interests have aligned in support of
cartelizing regulation of electronic cigarettes. As with other episodes of
Bootlegger and Baptist coalitions, it is unclear whether the resulting policies
will serve the public interest. There is evidence that electronic cigarettes pose
substantially lower health risks than traditional cigarettes and may help
smokers quit or reduce their tobacco consumption. Therefore, insofar as
regulation restricts electronic cigarettes, it may undermine public health.
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Introduction
In May 2016, the United States Food & Drug Administration (FDA)
finalized regulations subjecting electronic cigarettes (also known as "e-
cigarettes") to federal regulation. Utilizing authority provided by federal
tobacco legislation enacted in 2009, the FDA "deemed" e-cigarettes and other
vaping products (collectively known as "electronic nicotine delivery systems"
or ENDS) as "tobacco products" subject to federal regulation. This rule
subjects e-cigarettes to a wide range of federal regulatory requirements,
including restrictions on advertising and promotion, as well as various
reporting and disclosure requirements. Perhaps most significantly, deeming e-
cigarettes to be regulated as tobacco products subjects all such products to a
mandatory approval process that could hamstring all but the largest e-cigarette
2producers.
1. Deeming Tobacco Products to Be Subject to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 28974 (May 10, 2016) [hereinafter Deeming Tobacco Products to Be Subject to
FDCA]. F-cigarettes are devices that heat and vaporize a propylene-glycol solution that typically
contains nicotine and some sort of flavoring. See Zachary Cahn & Michael Siegel, Electronic Cigarettes
as a Harm Reduction Strategy for Tobacco Control: A Step Forward or a Repeat of Past Mistakes?, 32
J. PUB. HEALTH POL'Y 16, 17 (2011); see also infra Section JJJ.A (discussing development of e-
cigarettes and growth in e-cigarette market).
2. See Sabrina Tavernise, F.D.A. Imposes Rules for E-Cigarettes in a Landmark
Move, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2016), http://nyti.ms/23rXQXX (noting potential of new regulations to
benefit "large tobacco companies" at the expense of smaller firms); Shari Rudavsky, Indiana Vape Shop
Owners Say New FDA Rule Will Crush Industry, IND. STAR (May 9, 2016),
http://www.indystar.com/story/news/2016/05/08/indiana-vape-shop-owners-say-new-fda-rule-crush
-industry/84036264/ (noting fears that FDA rules will force smaller firms and stores to close).
The FDA initially proposed the deeming rule in April 2014, Deeming Tobacco Products
to Be Subject to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 23141 (April 25, 2014), and
was expected to make a final decision on whether to deem e-cigarettes as "tobacco products" in 2015,
but the decision was delayed, reportedly due to pressure from various interest groups. See Lydia
Wheeler, Business and Health Groups Jockey to Shape E-Cigarette Rule, THE HILL (Dec. 3, 2015),
http://thehill.com/regulation/261897-business-health-group s-j ockey-to-shape-e-cig-rule.
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Some health groups, particularly traditional anti-smoking groups, praised
the FDA's action.3 Such groups would like to see federal regulation of all
tobacco and tobacco-related products. Interestingly enough, major cigarette
manufacturers lined up in support of the FDA regulation as well, as have some
drug manufacturers.4 Major cigarette producers and some of the industry's
most persistent critics have aligned in support of greater regulation of e-
cigarettes.
It may seem strange that "Big Tobacco" and public health advocates are
on the same page when it comes to e-cigarettes. After all, smoking has long
been recognized as one of the greatest avoidable risks to public health, and
tobacco companies are despised by health organizations for the industry's
history of deceptive marketing practices.5 Yet as odd as it may sound, the
economic interests of incumbent tobacco firms are often aligned with the pro-
regulatory agenda of at least some public health advocates, anti-tobacco
organizations, and allied politicians. The result is something of an odd-
bedfellow coalition - but a formidable coalition nonetheless.
Coalitions between economic and social or moral interests - what Bruce
6Yandle labeled "Bootlegger and Baptist" coalitions - are not all that unusual.
There is a long history of such coalitions across a range of subjects. Economic
interests commonly have a significant effect on public policy, but so do
normative arguments and public-spirited policymakers and interest groups. As
a consequence, when such forces are aligned, they can have a particularly
powerful influence on policy outcomes. Whether such cooperation is formal or
3. See, e.g., Tavernise, supra note 2 ("The move was applauded by public health
experts who said the industry needed oversight and who had been waiting nearly seven years for the
agency to provide it."); Press Release, American Lung Association, FDA Asserts Oversight Authority
over Cigars, F-Cigarettes, Other Tobacco Products (May 5, 2016), http://www.lung.org/about
-us/media/press-releases/fda-asserts-oversight-tobacco-products-deeming.html; Press Release,
Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, Obama Administration Takes First Step to Protect Kids from F-
Cigarettes, Cigars, But Must Do More to Stop Kid-Friendly Flavors in F-Cigarettes (May 5, 2016),
http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/press releases/post/2016 05 05 ecig.
4. See infra Section IV.B. Financial analysts also concluded the FDA's new
regulations would be good for large tobacco companies. See, e.g., Guy Bentley, Wells Fargo. FDA's E-
Cigarette Regulations Are Good News For Big Tobacco, THE DAILY CALLER (May 5, 2016),
http://dailycaller.com/2016/05/05/wells-fargo-fdas-e-cigarette-regulations-are-good-news-for-big
-tobacco/#ixzz48D57kYSt.
5. See, e.g., DAVID A. KESSLER, A QUESTION OF INTENT: A GREAT AMERICAN
BATTLE WITH A DEADLY INDUSTRY (2001); Yussuf Saloojee & Ross Hammond, Fatal Deception. The
Tobacco Industry's "'New" Global Standards for Tobacco Marketing, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 3 (2001),
http://www.who.int/tobacco/media/en/fatal deception.pdf.
6. Yandle pioneered the term more than thirty years ago. See Bruce Yandle,
Bootleggers and Baptists. The Education of a Regulatory Economist, REG., May-June 1983, at 12; see
also Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists in Retrospect, REG., Fall 1999, at 5-7 [hereinafter Yandle,
Retrospect] (reflecting on development of Bootlegger and Baptist framework).
7. See generally ADAM SMITH & BRUCE YANDLE, BOOTLEGGERS & BAPTISTS: How
ECONOMIC FORCES AND MORAL PERSUASION INTERACT TO SHAPE REGULATORY POLITICS (2014). The
book details examples from various episodes in the United States including, in more recent years, the
Troubled Asset Relief Program bailout during the 2008 financial crisis, climate change, and the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 ("ObamaCare").
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intentional, the combining of economic and "moral" or public-focused interest
groups into a single coalition has had a substantial effect on the growth and
evolution of regulation in the United States.8
This Article examines the political and regulatory responses to the
emergence of electronic cigarettes in light of Yandle's Bootlegger-Baptist
theory of regulation. Section I summarizes Yandle's theory and places it in the
context of other positive theories of regulation and the role of interest groups in
regulatory policy. With this regulatory background in hand, Section II reviews
the development of tobacco regulation in the United States, focusing on the
Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) that resolved state legal claims against
cigarette manufacturers and subsequent federal legislation that provided the
FDA with regulatory authority over tobacco products. As this section shows,
the Bootlegger-Baptist theory demonstrates how advocacy by economic
interests and public-interest groups aligned to create a regulatory framework
that, among other things, suppressed competition to the benefit of incumbent
firms in existing tobacco markets.
The emergence of electronic cigarettes disrupted the status quo in tobacco
markets, creating new incentives for established firms to seek regulatory
intervention. Section III describes the development of e-cigarettes, their rapid
growth, and what is (and is not) known about their potential health effects. As
this section highlights, the growth in demand for e-cigarettes poses a substantial
threat to incumbent tobacco producers, but may also provide significant health
benefits insofar as e-cigarettes pose fewer health risks than traditional tobacco
products.
The push for regulation of e-cigarettes is replicating the Bootlegger-
Baptist dynamic that catalyzed the development of the MSA and federal
tobacco legislation. As explained in Section IV, both incumbent tobacco firms
and some public health advocates support treating e-cigarettes like traditional
tobacco products. Manufacturers of tobacco-cessation products (nicotine
replacement therapies or NRTs) also support regulation of e-cigarettes for
economic reasons. Moreover, state-level politicians are incentivized to treat e-
cigarettes like traditional tobacco products because of the potential effects on
state tax revenues. If this combination of interests succeeds, the likely effect
will be an ever-more cartelized industry that looks much like the post-MSA
cigarette industry. Whether or not any resulting regulation would benefit
consumers or protect public health remains to be seen.
I. Interest Groups and the Demand for Regulation
Government regulation permeates the U.S. economy. There are few
productive activities that are not subject to government regulation of one sort or
8. See infra Section I.B.
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another.9 What accounts for the extent of such regulation? Why are some
activities and industries regulated more than others? And why are regulatory
programs designed or implemented differently at different times or in different
contexts? Over the decades, political scientists, historians, and economists have
struggled to develop a positive theory of regulation. 10
The Baptist and Bootlegger theory, developed by economist Bruce
Yandle, sought to complement prior theories of interest-group involvement in
regulatory policy. Specifically, it sought to explain how economic interest
groups and moral or ideological interests often align in support of common
policy goals. In Yandle's view, understanding and recognizing the emergence
of such alliances made it easier to understand why some regulatory policy
initiatives failed and others succeeded.
A. Traditional Theories of Regulation
The oldest and perhaps most common explanation for government
regulation is called the Public Interest Theory. Under this theory, government
regulation is largely the product of public-spirited policymakers seeking to
enhance public welfare. On behalf of the public, policymakers develop and
impose various regulatory programs to address market failures, such as a failure
to account for externalities, the under-provision of public goods, and
information asymmetries, or tackle other perceived problems resulting from
uncoordinated private activities.
The Public Interest Theory posits that most policymakers systematically
attempt to serve the public interest when they enact laws, promulgate
regulations, and implement government programs. Policymakers are not
influenced by personal fortunes nor are they motivated to serve narrow special
interests from their home territories; they are truly public servants. While the
Public Interest Theory acknowledges the possibility of corruption or other
problems with government policy - after all, politicians and regulators are
human beings like the rest of us - the driving assumption of this theory is that
those who develop, promulgate, and enforce regulations are primarily engaged
in a well-intentioned effort to advance the public interest.
While the Public Interest Theory may work as a normative theory of what
governments should do, it has obvious deficiencies as a positive theory of what
governments will do. That is, the Public Interest Theory offers a limited
9. See, e.g., Clyde Wayne Crews, Jr., , Ten Thousand Commandments. An Annual
Snapshot of the Federal Regulatory State, COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST. (2015),
https://cei.org/sites/default/files/10%/ 2C000%o2OCommandments%/o202015%/o20-%/o2005-12-2015.pdf.
10. See generally JERRY BRITO & SUSAN E. DUDLEY, REGULATION 11-22 (2d ed.
2012) (summarizing theories of government regulation).
11. See generally STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1984)
(discussing various rationales for regulation). For a discussion of social and other non-economic, yet still
public-spirited, rationales for regulation, see CASS SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION:
RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE (1990).
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account of the incentives faced by policymakers and, as a consequence, does
not fully explain observed regulatory policies. The Public Interest Theory may
offer plausible explanations for many laws and regulations that are on the
books, but it fails to explain why some regulatory initiatives succeed and others
fail, particularly outside of traditional economic regulation. Even if one sets
aside government spending programs, which one may suspect are particularly
prone to rent-seeking and pork-barrel politics, there are many regulatory
decisions which cannot be explained by the Public Interest Theory, either
because the regulations in question do not advance the public interest or
because they are designed and implemented to achieve other ends. While the
existence of market failures may provide adequate justification for regulatory
interventions, the pattern of such interventions does not necessarily correspond
with the existence of such justifications. Regulations persist where there is little
economic justification for government intervention, while obvious cases for
government involvement remain unaddressed.
As explanations of political behavior developed, seasoned observers of the
political scene noticed that politicians often spoke about serving the public
interest, but their actions seemed to be guided by narrow special interest groups
if not by their personal career ambitions.12 That is, what policymakers said did
not line up with what policymakers did. Further, even well-intentioned
government programs did not appear to be implemented in a way to achieve the
public-spirited goals that may have inspired their creation. Regulators of
electricity producers spent a lot of time with folks from the industry being
regulated, people with experience in the railroad industry were called upon to
regulate the industry, and politicians preparing labor legislation had many
encounters with organized labor leaders. Put another way, politicians and
regulators who might speak about serving the public interest often seemed to be
captured by the industry or activity they were regulating. Thus was born the
Capture Theory, an explanation elaborated by Marver Bernstein13 and Gabriel
Kolko. 14
Capture Theory provided a helpful lens for observing political behavior
and, when applied, offered some useful insights into political action. But there
was a problem. When there were competing interest groups struggling to affect
12. Adam Smith actually made a similar observation:
The proposal of any new law or regulation of commerce which comes from this order ought always to
be listened to with great precaution, and ought never to be adopted till after having been long and
carefully examined, not only with the most scrupulous, but with the most suspicious attention. It comes
from an order of men whose interest is never exactly the same with that of the public, who have
generally an interest to deceive and even to oppress the public, and who accordingly have, upon many
occasions, both deceived and oppressed it.
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 339 (Edwin
Cannon ed., 2003).
13. See MARVER BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION
(1977).
14. See GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION
OF AMERICAN HISTORY: 1900-1916 (1963).
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an outcome - as with public health groups and tobacco companies when
cigarette-advertising regulation was being formed - the theory offered nothing
to predict which interest group might emerge victorious. Repairing this
theoretical flaw led to Nobel Laureate George Stigler's development of the
Special Interest Theory or the Economic Theory of Regulation.15 Stigler's
theory basically says "keep your eye on the money." The group with the most
to gain or lose will make the greatest effort to capture the politician or
regulator. And the larger and better organized the group, all else equal, the
better the prospects for winning a cartel-like outcome. Additional research by
Mancur Olson16 and Sam Peltzman,17 among others, further explicated how
concentrated interest groups can influence government agencies for their own
benefit at the expense of the public at large.
Stigler's theory still left a large question unanswered. Does it matter
which interest groups interact with politicians when seeking to organize
regulatory agreements? Put another way, are there certain key interest groups
that, when working together for a common goal, always tend to prevail?
Special interest groups matter a lot, but not just any collection of interest
groups seemed capable of enacting durable social regulation. Some legislative
and regulatory actions were not well explained by the Public Interest Theory or
the Capture Theory, which ultimately brought us to the Bootleggers and
Baptists Theory.
B. Bootleggers and Baptists
Bruce Yandle's contribution to interest-group theories of regulation was
his observation that interest-group influence could be more powerful when
those struggling to affect outcomes included distinctly different groups."
Specifically, he noted that economically motivated interest groups are more
likely to achieve their policy goals when supported by interest groups that
provide normative justifications for the same policies. Put in more colloquial
terms, the theory "tells a story of how public interest justification greases the
rails for purely private pursuits."'9 As Yandle explained:
Here is the essence of the theory: durable social regulation evolves when it is demanded by
both of two distinctly different groups. "Baptists" point to the moral high ground and give
vital and vocal endorsement of laudable public benefits promised by a desired regulation.
15. See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. OF ECON. &
MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971).
16. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND
THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
17. See Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. L. &
ECON. 211 (1976).
18. See SMITH & YANDLE, supra note 7, at 4 ("The Bootlegger/Baptist theory
provides a useful device for explaining crucial features of enduring social regulations that affect
consumers and producers worldwide.").
19. Id.
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Baptists flourish when their moral message forms a visible foundation for political action.
"Bootleggers" are much less visible but no less vital. Bootleggers, who expect to profit from
the very regulatory restrictions desired by Baptists, grease the political machinery with some
of their expected proceeds."
Each type of interest group is capable of influencing government policy,
and does so regularly. When they are aligned, however - when moral suasion is
backed or reinforced by economic muscle - they are particularly powerful and
are more likely to produce durable social regulation. Among other things, allied
politicians get the benefit of powerful moral rhetoric in addition to the muscle
of economic interest groups. For things to work, the Bootleggers and Baptists
need only pursue similar outcomes. They need not work directly together and,
in many instances, have quite different ultimate policy goals and likely disdain
each other.2'
Yandle chose the Bootlegger and Baptist labels in homage to the political
pairing of unlikely interests that was successful in championing laws that
shuttered liquor stores on Sunday.22 Though some Bootleggers might be
Baptists, and vice versa, the two interest groups would never form a visible
coalition in the strict sense of the word. Yet, despite their contrasting
motivations, they sought the same outcome and were willing to struggle
mightily to succeed. At the height of its success, this powerful pairing entirely
shut down the legal sale of alcoholic beverages in counties, states, and - during
23Prohibition (1920-193 3) - the nation as a whole.
The Baptists were a moral motivating force wanting to limit alcohol sales,
particularly on Sundays. The behavior engendered by alcohol created a target
for moral crusaders. Their support for limiting alcohol sales is easily
predictable. Laws limiting alcohol sales would satisfy the Baptists' preferences.
They also created an opportunity for Bootleggers. Limiting alcohol sales
reduced competition and created profit opportunities for those willing to sell
alcohol illegally (or, perhaps, in a neighboring jurisdiction without such laws).
While Bootleggers obviously have no objection to the sale of alcohol (and
certainly not to its consumption), they would be expected to support laws that
increase their profits.
Bootleggers and Baptists did their most noteworthy work years ago, but
alcohol distribution still takes place within cartel arrangements protected by
20. See Yandle, Retrospect, supra note 6, at 5. It should be noted that the original
formulation was chosen for alliterative purposes, and not to single out Baptists for being particularly
influential or blameworthy.
21. See SMITH & YANDLE, supra note 7, at viii (noting that Baptists and Bootleggers
need not expressly or openly coordinate their activities to be successful).
22. Note, however, that most such jurisdictions did not restrict Sunday consumption
of alcoholic beverages.
23. For a discussion of the role of interest groups in Prohibition and its repeal, see
Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution: An Economic Analysis of the
Constitutional Amendment Process, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 111, 119-20 (1993); SMITH & YANDLE, supra
note 7, at 79-81.
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state law. When threats arise that might disturb the cartel, seen most recently in
24the delivery of retail wine, Bootleggers and Baptists rise to the challenge.
State regulation of alcoholic beverages has produced a crazy-quilt set of rules.
In Texas, for example, many counties and cities are dry, while others allow
limited sales. Changes to the rules generate political battles among vested
interests. For example, craft brewers are required by law to give away
distribution rights.'5 Multiple parties have interests in such requirements: large,
established brewers do not wish to compete at retail stores with craft brews,
distributors like their protected distribution licenses, craft brewers would like to
expand retail opportunities, and teetotalers may wish to keep out any new
alcoholic products. The players change over time, but the battle is much the
same. Having invested significant resources to obtain a beneficial political
26agreement, the protagonists do not go quietly into the night. But Bootleggers
never march with placards before state capital buildings petitioning for renewal
27of soon-to-expire Sunday closing laws. The Baptists do that for them.
Meanwhile, crafty Bootleggers may (quietly) provide campaign contributions
for cooperative politicians or fund Baptist causes.
Note that Bootleggers did not support laws to limit alcohol consumption,
even though their Baptist brethren might. This point is important. Successful
Bootlegger/Baptist political interaction generates support for particular kinds of
regulation, specifically rules that satisfy the interests of both interest groups. In
the tobacco and e-cigarette context, as with alcohol, a Bootlegger/Baptist
coalition is likely to favor rules that suppress competition. This raises prices,
which Baptists like, but may also enable producers to capture monopoly rents.
Such policies may include limits on advertising and promotion and restrictions
on new market entry. The coalition is unlikely to endorse measures that directly
target consumption, however. That is where the interests of the Bootleggers and
the Baptists diverge.
The Bootlegger/Baptist theory helps us understand a host of regulatory
episodes. For example, the theory helps explain certain features of federal clean
air legislation. Environmental groups want controls on emissions. Existing
emitting firms wish to avoid the regulatory costs of adopting emission controls,
and prefer to reduce the risks of competition from new entrants. Both will
24. Kim Marcus, Bizarre Coalition Opposes Direct Shipment of Wine, WINE
SPECTATOR (Feb. 14, 2005), http://www.winespectator.com/webfeature/show/id/Bizarre-Coalition
-Opposes-Direct-Shipment-of-Wine 2398; SMITH & YANDLE, supra note 7, at 83-87.
25. The Institute for Justice represents three craft brewers challenging the distribution
rules. For background, see Texas Craft Beer, INST. FOR JUST., http://ij.org/case/texas-craft-beer (last
visited Apr. 10, 2016).
26. Alcohol producers routinely make contributions to election campaigns for, we
presume, good business reasons. For details regarding 2015-16 contributions, see Beer, Wine, and
Liquor: Top Contributors to Federal Candidates, Parties, and Outside Groups, OPENSECRETS.ORG
http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.php?ind N02 (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
27. TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 105.01 (West 2007) (providing details of Sunday
(and other day) closing rules in Texas, which are not atypical).
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support laws that impose stricter standards on newly constructed manufacturing
28plants than on existing plants. Similarly, environmental groups and producers
of alternative energy products will support regulations that control greenhouse
gas emissions, the former due to concerns about global warming, the latter in
29pursuit of a competitive advantage. Such coalitions are not only political. In
some cases, the Bootleggers directly fund Baptist coffers so as to help increase
their political strength. The Sierra Club, for example, received millions of
dollars from natural gas interests to support the group's campaign againstS 30
competing energy sources, coal in particular.
While regulatory Baptists may seek laws that are more stringent than
bootleggers would support, they may settle for less stringent, or less optimal,
regulatory measures if the alternative is a likely political defeat. For example,
as Bruce Ackerman and William Hassler documented in Clean Coal/Dirty Air,
environmentalist groups supported regulatory measures that advantaged the
producers of high-sulfur coal as against the producers of low-sulfur coal, evenS 31
though such measures would also be less effective than potential alternatives.
A similar story can be told about the development of the alternative fuel and
32reformulated gasoline requirements of the 1990 Clean Air Act.
Public health and environmental regulations may provide particularly
fertile ground for Baptist-Bootlegger coalitions because it can be difficult to
oppose health and environmental measures openly. Instead, economic interest
groups have learned that they stand to gain when policy measures that increase
their bottom line can claim the support of public-spirited interest groups.
Sometimes the resulting regulations produce good policy, but sometimes they
do not.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Hazardous Waste Treatment
Council (HWTC) sought more stringent enforcement of laws governing
hazardous waste treatment and disposal. Because HWTC's members operated
hazardous waste incinerators and treatment facilities, they stood to benefit from
an expansion of treatment requirements. The HWTC joined forces with
environmentalist groups to support a range of regulatory initiatives. Yet not all
of these measures were environmentally beneficial. In some cases, this
28. For examples from environmental law, see ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC
COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS (Michael Greve & Fred L. Smith, Jr. eds., 1992); Jonathan H. Adler, Clean
Politics, Dirty Profits, in POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM: GOING BEHIND THE GREEN CURTAIN 1
(Terry Anderson ed., 2000); Todd J. Zywicki, Environmental Externalities and Political Externalities.
The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73 TUE. L. REV. 845 (1999).
29. See Bruce Yandle & Smart Buck, Bootleggers, Baptists, and the Global Warming
Battle, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 177 (2002).
30. Bryan Walsh, How the Sierra Club Took Millions from the Natural Gas
Industry-and Why They Stopped, TIME (Feb. 2, 2012), http://science.time.com/2012/02/02/exclusive
-how-the-sierra-club-took-mittions-from-the-natura-gas-industry-and-why-they-stopped.
31. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 35-37
(1981).
32. See Jonathan H. Adler, Clean Fuels, Dirty Air, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS:
PUBLIC COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS 19 (Michael S. Greve & Fred L. Smith, Jr. eds., 1992).
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Bootlegger and Baptist coalition opposed measures to reduce the generation of
hazardous waste and supported regulations that could have discouraged the
recycling of particular waste streams.33 In other instances, hazardous waste
incinerator companies funded environmental groups that would attack their
competitors.34
Just because concentrated interest groups stand to benefit economically
from a given regulatory measure does not mean that such measures are bad
policy. In some cases, economic interest groups may provide essential support
for worthwhile measures. It is unlikely the United States would have agreed to
phase out the use of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) when it did if doing so had not
been in the economic interest of major CFC producers.35 CFCs, a widely used
class of propellants and refrigerants, were linked to thinning of the stratospheric
ozone layer. The largest CFC producer, DuPont, opposed the CFC phase-out
36until it was in DuPont's interest to reverse course. While DuPont had once
enjoyed the dominant position in the CFC market, foreign producers had begun
to erode DuPont's market share, and DuPont was in a strong position to market
CFC substitutes. Although some groups still opposed a CFC phase-out, once
significant Bootleggers joined the Baptist side, it became relatively easy to
move forward with the phase-out, and the ozone layer was protected.3
Bootlegger and Baptist coalitions may or may not lead to the development
of sound policy. In some cases, Bootlegger interests will coincide with public
welfare. In other cases, however, Bootlegger interests will distort or subvert the
adoption of welfare-enhancing measures. In the case of e-cigarette regulation,
that risk is real.
11. Tobacco Regulation and the Master Settlement Agreement
The history of tobacco regulation provides ample evidence of the
importance of Bootlegger and Baptist coalitions. Indeed, much tobacco
regulation resulted from the efforts of both Bootleggers (the tobacco
companies) and Baptists (public health organizations and policymakers). One
consequence of this is that tobacco regulation has often served to enhance the
profits of incumbent firms as much as (if not more than) it has combated the
38public health harms associated with smoking. In some cases, it even appears
33. See Adler, supra note 28, at 14-16; Mark K. Landy & Mary Hague, The Coalition
for Waste. Private Interests and Superfund, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC COSTS, PRIVATE
REWARDS 67 (Michael S. Greve & Fred L. Smith, Jr. eds., 1992).
34. See Adler, supra note 28, at 16-17.
35. See Daniel F. McInnis, Ozone Layers and Oligopoly Profits, in ENVIRONMENTAL
POLITICS: PUBLIC COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS 129, 130 (Michael S. Greve & Fred L. Smith, Jr. eds.,
1992).
36. See Adler, supra note 28, at 21-22.
37. See id.
38. The tobacco companies did not want the regulations that began a half-century
ago, but have played the political game very well since, so they have remained profitable. The demise of
the Big Tobacco companies has been predicted for decades, but their rate of return, as seen in stock
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as if tobacco industry regulation primarily served the interests of Bootleggers,
though it was facilitated by a Baptist veneer.
A. Pre-Master Settlement Agreement Regulation
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, shortly before the first Surgeon
General's report, news stories called attention to the harmful effects of
smoking. Innovative cigarette producers responded by developing filter tips
that were often accompanied with health claims for the new "safer" cigarettes.39
As might be expected in a competitive marketplace, a low tar and nicotine
derby developed in the industry, with producers competing at the health margin
when developing and selling their wares. Consumption of higher tar and
nicotine products began to fall.40
When the Surgeon General's report of the harmful effects of smoking was
released in 1964, it provided an opportunity for a new political player in the
tobacco field.41 A regulatory agency, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC),
soon announced a proposed requirement for a battery of warning labels to be
42affixed to all cigarette packages. Using dire language highlighting that
smoking can cause death, the FTC proposal brought an immediate reaction
from cigarette producers. Congress responded by showing a preference for a
calmer, more tobacco-friendly warning.43 Congress swiftly passed legislation
that instructed the FTC to regulate but to ride easier on the industry and
preempted state and local efforts to mandate more stringent warnings.44
Alarmed about the misleading nature of health claims for the new low-tar
and filtered cigarettes, and conscious of its responsibility for enforcing truth in
prices, generally beats the market. Paul R. La Monica, Smoking Is Not Cool. But Cigarette Stocks Are
Hot, CNN MONEY (July 29, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/07/29/investing/cigarettes-altria
-reynolds-american-stocks-earnings.
39. For a more extensive discussion of the role of Bootleggers and Baptists in the
evolution of tobacco regulation, see, Bruce Yandle et al., Bootleggers, Baptists & Televangelists.
Regulating Tobacco by Litigation, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1225. For more on the history of tobacco
regulation and the role of interest groups, see A. LEE FRITSCHLER, SMOKING AND POLITICS:
POLICYMAKING AND THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY (2006); RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO ASHES:
AMERICA'S HUNDRED YEAR CIGARETTE WAR, THE PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE UNABASHED TRIUMPH
OF PHILIP MORRIS (1997); PETER PRINGLE, CORNERED: BIG TOBACCO AT THE BAR OF JUSTICE (1998).
40. See Lynn T. Kozlowski & Richard J. O'Connor, Dealing with Health Fears.
Cigarette Advertising in the United States in the Twentieth Century, in TOBACCO AND PUBLIC HEALTH:
SCIENCE AND POLICY 37, 39-41 (Peter Boyle et al. eds., 2004) (discussing the "tar derby" competition
among cigarette producers to offer low-tar brands).
41. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH: REPORT
OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE (1964);
Peter D. Jacobson et al., Historical Overview of Tobacco Legislation and Regulation, 53 J. SOC. ISSUES
75, 85 (1997).
42. Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the
Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8325 (July 29, 1965) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 408).
43. See Yandle et al., supra note 39, at 1249-5 1.
44. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (2012).
The preemption provision is contained in section 1334.
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advertising, with a blast of a Baptist trumpet, the FTC again intervened.4 5 It
argued that there was no meaningful difference among various cigarettes,
banned the use of health claims in all advertising, and established itself and its
smoking machine laboratory as the source of any data that might be used in
advertising nicotine and tar content. Competition over health claims declined,
46as did the entry of new and perhaps safer cigarettes. Innovation was chilled.
Competition on this margin declined and the industry became a bit more
cartelized with help from the government. But he Bootlegger/Baptist story was
just beginning.4
With health-concerns building, the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) entered the fray. In response to a citizen petition, in 1967 the FCC
applied the Fairness Doctrine48 to tobacco advertising, requiring free TV time
for competing anti-tobacco public interest messages whenever a television
station or network sold ad time to a tobacco company.49 Along with the
negative publicity about the health effects of smoking, the FCC mandate
appeared to have an effect, as per capita smoking began to decline.50 In 1969,
responding to consumer group pressure, the FCC proposed a ban on TV
advertising for cigarette and tobacco products, and the FTC proposed tougher
warning labels.51 The Baptists were being heard, and the cigarette-producing
bootleggers did not like what they were hearing. The anti-smoking campaign
had an impact on sales, with per-capita cigarette consumption falling by 5.7
52percent between 1967 and 1970.
The tobacco industry was not as enamored with these regulatory
initiatives as were some health-oriented groups. Congress reacted to such
concerns with new legislation that weakened the FTC's proposed label
language while banning TV advertising starting in 1971.s3 Far from a loss for
45. See Yandle et al., supra note 39, at 1248.
46. John E. Calfee, The Ghost of Cigarette Advertising Past, REG., Summer 1997, at
35; see also John E. Calfee, Cigarette Advertising, Health Information and Regulation Before 1970
(Fed. Trade Comm'n, Working Paper No. 134, 1985) (discussing health claims in cigarette advertising
prior to 1970).
47. Yandle and Morriss, with coauthors, expanded on this in their analysis of tobacco
regulation through the MSA, adding in "Televangelists" (the state attorneys general and plaintiffs' bar),
players who, they argued, feigned moral indignation while having motivations more akin to the
Bootleggers. See Yandle et aL., supra note 39, at 1236-40.
48. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding
constitutionality of the Fairness Doctrine). Under the Fairness Doctrine, television and radio broadcast
licensees were required to cover issues of public importance and to provide "fair coverage" of such
issues. Id. at 369.
49. See In re TV Station WCBS-TV, 8 F.C.C.2d 381 (1967), recons. denied 9
F.C.C.2d 921 (1967) (holding that the Fairness Doctrine is applicable to cigarette advertisements).
50. See Yandle et al., supra note 39, at 1252.
51. See FCC, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Advertisement of Cigarettes, 34 Fed.
Reg. 1959 (Feb. 11, 1969).
52. See Yandle et al., supra note 39, at 1252.
53. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87
(1970); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (2012) (prohibiting cigarette and cigar advertising in electronic media
subject to FCC jurisdiction).
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the industry, this legislation erected a substantial entry barrier for potential
competitors5 4 The established brands enjoyed widespread name recognition,
and new entrants would be unable to use television to establish their brands .5
The elimination of television ads for cigarettes also brought an end to the
offsetting public interest messages that attacked tobacco products and reduced
cigarette company advertising costs.56 The tobacco Bootleggers gained ground,
and innovation took the back seat in what began to look like a comfortable
cartel. Meanwhile, the health-care Baptists may have unwittingly cheered the
new strictures that seemed to penalize bad Bootlegger behavior but actually
protected their profits.
Prior to the advent of ever more stringent regulations that limited
marketing practices, U.S. cigarette producers jockeyed for consumer patronage
by constantly introducing heavily advertised tobacco products. There were
filter tips, flavors, shorts, longs, and soft and hard packages, all designed to
shape and satisfy demand for tobacco products. Over the years there have also
been efforts to develop alternative nicotine products. After all, cigarettes have
been called "cancer sticks" for decades for good reason. The harmful effects
have long been known, but nicotine, which comes via tobacco, is addictive. The
industry then rested somewhat comfortably, even as demand weakened,
continuing to earn profits because of the restrictions on competition.
Despite advertising restrictions that protected established brands, Big
Tobacco began losing sales to less-costly upstarts. Loss of market share became
so severe that the maker of Marlboro announced a twenty percent price cut on
Friday, April 2, 1993 . Now referred to as Marlboro Friday, due to the sharp
decline in stocks of firms that relied heavily on brand name recognition, Philip
Morris's action did just what the firm hoped it would. Competition was beaten
back; Marlboro recovered market share; and three years later the firm's shares
had fully recovered. Strategic response to competition and ever-rising calls for
restrictions due to health concerns has long been part of cigarette makers'
struggle to survive.
B. The Master Settlement Agreement
The 1998 Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) between the nation's
largest cigarette manufacturers and state attorneys general (AGs) was a
milestone in tobacco regulation. The MSA heavily influences the structure of
the cigarette industry to this day. The agreement included a series of regulatory
54. See Yandle et al., supra note 39, at 1253-54.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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restrictions on the industry and cemented the dominant market position of
existing manufacturers.58
The MSA was adopted to resolve a series of lawsuits filed by state AGs
against cigarette manufacturers. The first suit was brought by the state of
Mississippi in 1994; other states quickly followed.5 9 By mid-1997, more than
thirty states had filed suit. Aiding the state AGs in their efforts were numerous
prominent plaintiffs' attorneys, who stood to reap substantial rewards if the
suits proved successful.
6 °
Prior litigation against tobacco companies, typically filed by former
smokers seeking damages for the health consequences of smoking, had largely
61failed. Plaintiffs found it difficult legally to claim they had been harmed by
the cigarette industry's deceptions about the health risks of smoking when
every package of cigarettes carried a government-mandated warning. The
tobacco companies also benefited from the widespread view among potential
jurors that the dangers of smoking were well known. The state lawsuits were
different. The states sought reimbursement for the health care expenditures they
62incurred caring for smokers under the Medicaid program. Unlike the claims
brought by former smokers, these suits could not be deflected by turning the
focus to the smokers' choices.
The cigarette manufacturers recognized the state AG lawsuits as a
potential existential threat, and sought a truce. In 1997, industry lawyers began
negotiating with the AGs in an effort to bring "peace forever.63 By June they
had reached a tentative agreement ("the Resolution"), under which the cigarette
companies agreed to pay $10 billion initially and $15 billion annually in
64perpetuity in return for protection from future lawsuits. The cost of the
65
payments would be borne by cigarette consumers in the form of higher prices.
58. This discussion of the MSA draws upon Yandle et al., supra note 39, at 1270-71.
59. See Michael DeBow, The State Tobacco Litigation and the Separation of Powers
in State Governments. Repairing the Damage, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 563, 566 (2001) (detailing the
chronology of state suits against cigarette manufacturers); MARTHA A. DERTHICK, UP IN SMOKE: FROM
LEGISLATION TO LITIGATION IN TOBACCO POLITICS 167-70 (2d ed. 2005) (same).
60. For instance, noted plaintiffs attorney Ronald L. Motley and his partners realized
fees in excess of $1 billion for their role in the securing of the MSA. See Barry Meier, The Spoils of
Tobacco Wars; Big Settlement Puts Many Lawyers in the Path of a Windfall, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 22,
1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/12/22/business/spoils-tobacco-wars-big-settlement-puts-many
-lawyers-path-windfall.html; see also DAN ZEGART, CIVIL WARRIORS: THE LEGAL SIEGE ON THE
TOBACCO INDUSTRY (2000) (discussing the role of plaintiff attorneys in tobacco litigation).
61. Yandle et al., supra note 39, at 1259-63.
62. Id. at 1261.
63. See KESSLER, supra note 5, at 361.
64. See Proposed Settlement Resolution Between the Tobacco Industry, State
Attorneys General, and Plaintiffs' Lawyers (June 20, 1997), available at http://stic.neu.edu/settlement/6
-20-settle.pdf [hereinafter Resolution]; see also ZEGART, supra note 60, at 253-71 (describing the
negotiations that led to the Resolution).
65. By one estimate, as much as ninety percent of the costs of the settlement would be
borne by smokers. DeBow, supra note 59, at 569 (citing estimates by W. Kip Viscusi); see also W. Kip
Viscusi, A Post-Mortem on the Tobacco Settlement, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 523, 538-44 (1999)(discussing
the costs of the tobacco settlement).
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The Resolution also provided for limited FDA regulation of the industry, and
contained requirements to protect participating cigarette companies from non-
signers to the agreement and new entrants; these parties were required to
contribute to the settlement fund as well.
66
Because the Resolution anticipated changes in federal law, such as
legislative authorization of FDA regulation of cigarettes, it needed
Congressional approval. That was not to be.0 Although the Resolution
promised total payments well in excess of $300 billion, anti-smoking activists
thought the deal was insufficient, particularly because of the limits on litigation
68and federal regulation. Moreover, all the payments were to go to the
69participating states, leaving the federal government with nothing. Seeking to
promote its own interests, Congress added provisions to the deal that cut it in
on the benefits, including a $1.10 per pack increase in federal cigarette taxes. 0
This was too much for the industry to stomach. The cigarette companies turned
against the legislation authorizing the Resolution, and it failed to pass.
Although they failed to get legislation approving the Resolution through
Congress, both the state AGs and the cigarette manufacturers till wanted a
deal. Secret negotiations between several AGs, plaintiffs' lawyers, and cigarette
industry attorneys produced a new agreement, the Master Settlement
Agreement.7 2 After its release in late 1998, it was quickly endorsed by forty-six
state AGs. (The remaining four states had already reached separate
settlements with the cigarette companies, each of which was preserved under
the MSA. 74)
Like the Resolution, the MSA promised substantial payments from the
then-four dominant cigarette companies to state coffers, funded by cigarette
price hikes. Like the Resolution, the MSA protected participating cigarette
companies from competition. The firms negotiated some benefits to cushion the
blow imposed by the heavy payments to which they agreed. All firms enjoyed
some benefits from the cost savings imposed by restrictions on industry
76advertising and promotional efforts. Unlike the Resolution, the MSA did not
66. See Resolution, supra note 64, at tit. IE-F, tit. V.A.
67. See ZEGART, supra note 60, at 261-67.
68. See Yandle et al., supra note 39, at 1267-68.
69. Id. at 1270.
70. See S. REP. NO. 105-180, at 12 (1998).
71. See Nancy Gibbs, Up in Smoke, TIME (June 29, 1998),
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,988614,00.html.
72. For the full text of the Master Settlement Agreement, see Master Settlement
Agreement, CAL. DEP'T OF JUST. OFF. OF THE ATT'Y GEN. (Nov. 23, 1998),
http://caag.state.ca.us/tobacco/pdf/lmsa.pdf [hereinafter MSA].
73. See DERTHICK, supra note 59, at 166.
74. Id.
75. See Yandle et al., supra note 39, at 1270-71.
76. Id.; see also supra Section I.A (discussing the original restrictions on advertising
in 1971 that froze brands in place).
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green-light FDA regulation or offer federal immunity from suit." As a
consequence, the MSA, unlike the Resolution, did not need legislative approval
in Congress and so the AGs, plaintiffs' lawyers, and tobacco companies were
able to cut Congress out of the deal. 8
The heart of the MSA was the promised payment of $206 billion by the
four participating cigarette companies to the participating states.79 As under the
Resolution, these payments would be tax deductible and the costs would be
paid by consumers in the form of higher cigarette prices.8° The MSA presented
state legislatures with a simple choice: accept the MSA in whole and be able to
spend your state's share of the billions of dollars raised from smokers, or reject
the proposed statute, still have your state's smokers pay the higher prices
necessary to fund the deal, and lose your state's claim on the money. Not
surprisingly, every state legislature took the money.
Responsibility for the payments was allocated among the cigarette
companies in proportion to their current market share, thereby reducing the
incentive for the participating cigarette companies to engage in price
competition amongst themselves to increase their respective market shares.81
The structure of the MSA thus provided a powerful incentive for each company
to remain satisfied with the status quo.
The MSA protected the major cigarette companies from new
competition.82 At the time of the agreement, the four participating cigarette
companies accounted for all but a small fraction of domestic cigarette sales.
83
Increasing cigarette prices to pay for the settlement risked a loss of market
share to marginal competitors or new entrants. Therefore, the MSA provided
that, for every percent of market share lost by a participating cigarette
manufacturer over two percent, it would be allowed to reduce its payments to
the states by three percent, unless each participating state enacted a statute to
prevent price competition from non-participating manufacturers, as each state
did.84 The statutes require non-participating cigarette producers to make
payments equal to or greater than what they would owe had they been
participants in the agreement so as to eliminate the cost advantage they might
77. See Yandle et al., supra note 39, at 1270.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Because cigarette consumption is highly price inelastic, the cost of the price
increase was largely borne by consumers rather than producers. As one commentator noted, "In all but
name, the payments are a national consumption tax, paid almost entirely by individual smokers (rather
than the settling companies' shareholders or employees)." Michael S. Greve, Compacts and Collusion,
AEI FEDERALIST OUTLOOK, (Apr. 2002),
http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10 /Compacts%o20and%/o2OCollision.pdf.
81. Yandle et al., supra note 39, at 1270 n.254.
82. Id.
83. In 1997, Philip Morris, R.J. Reynolds, and Lorillard together held 99.6 percent of
the cigarette market. See Vanessa O'Connell, Big Tobacco Gets Favorable Ruling, WALL ST. J. B3
(Mar. 29, 2006). This market share had dropped to 92 percent by 2003. Id
84. See Yandle et al., supra note 39, at 1270-71 n.256.
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otherwise have.5 This was problematic, as the new entrants could not be
argued to have contributed to the past harms that were the theoretical
justification for the payments to the states.
The MSA included restrictions on cigarette advertising, agreed to by the
86participating producers. The advertising limits could be portrayed as a public-
health measure, particularly insofar as they reduced advertising that could be
targeted at, or otherwise influence, young adults and teens. They also served to
reinforce the anti-competitive nature of the MSA, as they made it more difficult
for new brands or entrants to secure market share through promotional efforts.
87
As it turned out, the MSA was not quite as effective at suppressing
competition as some of the signatories may have hoped.88 Within five years,
several upstart cigarette companies had captured approximately ten percent of
the market, forcing the participating cigarette companies to cut prices, increase
promotional expenditures, and decrease payments to the states.89 The MSA
helped cartelize the industry, but it did not provide as much insulation against
new entrants into the market as industry participants would have liked.
In spite of battles with the new competition, the MSA enabled the major
cigarette manufacturers to increase prices by more than was necessary to make
the mandated MSA payments.90 The MSA's cartel-reinforcing provisions
sufficiently suppressed competition to enable cigarette companies to take
advantage of the price inelasticity of cigarette demand and obtain record
profits.91 Not only was the MSA anti-competitive, but some legal experts
92argued it was unconstitutional as well (although courts have not yet agreed).
Nevertheless, the MSA poured competition-suppressing concrete around major
tobacco companies, perhaps dulling the market spur for new product
development. The stage was set for innovation from outside the industry and a
delayed industry response.
C. Federal Tobacco Legislation
Although the MSA provided the dominant cigarette producers with some
protection from competition, it did not have the force of federal law. In its
85. The MSA also has provisions governing the obligations of "subsequent
participating manufacturers" (SPMs) - that is, cigarette companies that joined after the MSA was
agreed upon. Under these provisions, SPMs are only liable for payments should they increase their
market share above what they were at the time of the agreement. Id.
86. See MSA, supra note 72, pt. JJJ(a)-(i).
87. Yandle et al., supra note 39, at 1267 n.239.
88. Id. at 1270.
89. Id. at 1270-72.
90. Id. at 1232.
91. Mark Curriden, Up in Smoke, ABA J. (Mar. 18, 2007),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/up in smoke (noting Philip Morris's profits increased 36
percent between 1997 and 2005).
92. See, e.g., Brief of Constitutional Law Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting the
Petition for Certiorari, S&M Brands, Inc. v. Caldwell, 562 U.S. 1270 (2010) (No. 10-622).
Vol. 33, 2016
Baptists, Bootleggers & Electronic Cigarettes
wake, anti-smoking groups still wished to see increased federal regulation of
cigarettes. The cigarette industry was happy to go along, if such regulation
would reinforce the constraints of the MSA, deflect further tort litigation, and
preempt some state and local regulation.
Altria, in particular, sought legislation granting the FDA authority to
regulate cigarettes and other tobacco products.93 It spent years urging the
passage of a federal tobacco legislation that would authorize federal
regulation.94 While Altria did not want to grant the FDA the sweeping authority
the agency attempted to claim during the Clinton Administration (and which
had been rejected by the Supreme Court in FDA v. Brown & Williamson),95 it
supported "'tough' but 'reasonable' regulation that could preempt additional
96waves of tort litigation and would help to suppress competition. In this sense,
federal regulation would complement, and reinforce, the anti-competitive
elements of the MSA.
While other tobacco companies supported some FDA regulation in
principle, they split with Altria on the final legislation to give the FDA
jurisdiction over tobacco products.9  Altria prevailed. In anticipation of the
law's passage, the New York Times called it "the tobacco regulation that Philip
Morris can live with." 98 Anti-smoking and public health groups were also not
monolithic in their support of the final legislation. Leading anti-smoking
advocates such as Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, the American Heart
Association, the American Cancer Association, and the American Lung
Association joined with Phillip Morris in lobbying for the bill. 99 They believed
the law was an important step in the war against smoking. However, the Center
for Tobacco Control Research and Education at the University of California,
San Francisco saw the health-care advocates support as capitulation to the
enemy.00 Senator Mike Enzi (R-WY) denounced the legislation as a "peace
treaty" with Big Tobacco that Philip Morris helped write, and dubbed the bill
93. P.A. McDaniel & R. E. Malone, Understanding Philip Morris's Pursuit of US
Government Regulation of Tobacco, 14 TOBACCO CONTROL 193-200 (2005).
94. See Joe Nocera, If It's Good for Philip Morris, Can It Also Be Good for Public
Health?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 18, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/18/magazine/18tobacco.html.
95. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
96. McDaniel & Malone, supra note 93, at 194-95; Samuel Lowenberg, Smoke
Screen. Why Is Philip Morris Supporting FDA Regulation of Cigarettes?, SLATE (July 25, 2002),
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2002/07/smoke screen.html.
97. C. STEPHEN REDHEAD & VANESSA K. BURROWS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R40475, FDA TOBACCO REGULATION: THE FAMILY SMOKING PREVENTION AND TOBACCO CONTROL
ACT OF 2009 (2009)..
98. Duff Wilson, Philip Morris's Support Casts Shadow over a Bill to Limit Tobacco,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/01/business/Oltobacco.html.
99. REDHEAD & BURROWS, supra note 97, at 4.
100. See Kristi Keck, Big Tobacco Down but Not Snuffed Out, CNN (June 22, 2009),
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/06/19/tobacco.lobby (detailing disappointment of some tobacco
-control groups with the legislation).
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the "Marlboro Protection Act."''1 In any case, the Bootlegger/Baptist line-up in
favor was overwhelming.
The resulting legislation, the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco
Control Act of 2009, granted the FDA authority to regulate cigarettes and other
102tobacco products under a new regulatory regime tailored to the industry. The
Act created a new division within the FDA, the Center for Tobacco Products,
financed by fees on tobacco manufacturers.103 The Act also barred flavoring
cigarettes other than with menthol, authorized the FDA to set product standards
for cigarettes, and imposed more-explicit warning labels on tobacco
products.104 It limited cigarette advertising generally, enacted additional
specific restrictions on the marketing of "modified risk tobacco products" -
that is, tobacco products, other than NRT products, that present reduced health
risks - and created a mechanism through which the FDA could assert
regulatory authority over nontraditional tobacco products, including e-
cigarettes.105 The Act also created a requirement for premarket approval of all
new tobacco products, unless the manufacturer could demonstrate that the new
product was substantially equivalent to a product marketed prior to February
15, 2007.106
The Tobacco Control Act's regulatory provisions apply to cigarettes,
cigarette tobacco, smokeless tobacco, and roll-your-own tobacco. The law
provided the FDA the authority to subject other products "made or derived
from tobacco" and "intended for human consumption" to its regulatory
regime.107 Specifically, the FDA may "deem" other such products to be
regulated as "tobacco products" under the Act. 1°8 Products "deemed" to be
"tobacco products" under the Act become subject to many of its requirements,
including the prohibition on adulterated or misbranded products, mandatory
manufacturer registration and content disclosure requirements, restrictions on
modified risk claims, and mandatory premarket review of products marketed
after February 15, 2007.109 In the case of e-cigarettes, this latter provision
101. See, e.g., Mike Enzi, HELP Committee Passes a "'Marlboro Protection Act,"
THE HILL (Aug. 1, 2007, 2:24 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/27745-help
-cormittee-passes-a-marlboro-protection-act-sen-mike-enzi
102. See 21 U.S.C. § 387a (2012).
103. Id at §387a(e).
104. Id. at §
3 8
7g.
105. Id. at §387f (restrictions on advertising), §387f-1 (enforcement of limitations on
advertising), §387k (regulation of "modified risk" tobacco products), §387a(b) (authority of FDA
commissioner to "deem" other products to constitute tobacco products).
106. Id at § 387j (2012).
107. Id at §387a.
108. Id at §387a (b).
109. Id. The FDA has indicated that even relatively modest changes in product design
or packaging will be sufficient to identify a product as a new tobacco product, and not substantially
equivalent to a product already on the market. See Guidance for Industry. Demonstrating the Substantial
Equivalence of a New Tobacco Product: Responses to Frequently Asked Questions, FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. ( Sept. 8, 2015),
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would require mandatory review of all, or nearly all, products currently on the
market.
Passage of the Tobacco Control Act established the exclusive means of
regulating tobacco products. In 2009, the FDA briefly sought to regulate e-
cigarettes under the drug and device provisions of the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act.110 Specifically, the FDA sought to prohibit the importation of e-
cigarettes by NJOY, claiming the products were adulterated, misbranded, or
unapproved drug-device combinations under the FDCA.111 Under the FDA's
theory, because e-cigarettes are devices that deliver nicotine, they could be
regulated as drug-device combinations. This position, had it prevailed, could
have effectively prohibited e-cigarettes containing nicotine. The FDA's
position was rejected in federal court after a legal challenge by NJOY,
however. In Sottera, Inc. v. FDA, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit held that e-cigarettes, like other tobacco products, are, in the absence of
therapeutic claims, only subject to FDA regulation under the Tobacco Control
Act.1 2 The FDA's attempt to extend its authority under the FDCA to e-
cigarettes-like its prior effort in the 1990s to extend its regulatory authority to
cigarettes - exceeded its statutory authority. Insofar as the FDA believes
regulation of e-cigarettes is warranted, it would have to pursue such regulation
through its authority under the Tobacco Control Act, as the agency
subsequently did. In May 2016, the FDA finalized a rule deeming e-cigarettes
and related products to be "tobacco products" subject to regulation under the
Act. 113 The e-cigarette industry will never be the same.
III. The Emergence of Electronic Cigarettes
The cartelization of the tobacco industry - first by the MSA and then by
federal tobacco legislation - created opportunities for entrepreneurs. Although
the MSA and federal law made things difficult for new entrants into cigarette
markets, they did not close off the possibility of competing products that could
substitute for cigarettes. Indeed, in some respects the MSA and federal
regulations increased opportunities for firms to profit by developing
alternatives. By increasing the retail price of cigarettes, the MSA made the
market for cigarette alternatives more enticing to entrepreneurs. Into the void
came the electronic cigarette. E-cigarettes are a potential substitute for
traditional tobacco products that pose a significant threat to the tobacco
industry as it exists today. E-cigarettes may also be a threat to the makers of
http://www.fda.gov/downtoads/TobaccoProducts/Labeling/RulesRegulationsGuidance/UCM436468.pdf
110. See Sottera, Inc. v. FDA, 627 F.3d 891, 893 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
111. Id
112. Id
113. Deeming Tobacco Products to Be Subject to FDCA, supra note 1.
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nicotine replacement therapies and other smoking substitutes."14  The
development of e-cigarettes may also have implications for public health.
A. A Disruptive Technology
Electronic cigarettes, also known as "e-cigarettes" or "e-cigs," are a
"disruptive technology" that threaten the existing cigarette industry and
conventional products."15 E-cigarettes are not cigarettes and do not contain
tobacco. They are, however, a device that can be used to "mimic[] the act of
smoking" and deliver the nicotine that smokers crave.'16 For some, they have
the potential to replace cigarettes (and other products) as a source of nicotine.
Indeed, some suggest that e-cigarettes could make tobacco cigarettes
"obsolete."' "17 The effect of e-cigarettes on the tobacco industry could be like
the effect that digital cameras had on traditional cameras and photographic
film.''
8
E-cigarettes were invented in China in the early 2000s and introduced in
the United States in 2006.119 Most production occurs in China, but the product
has evolved and spread around the world. Electronic cigarettes come in
multiple varieties and new products are developed with some frequency. By
2014, there were already "dozens" of e-cigarette manufacturers and "hundreds"
of different models.12
0
Most electronic cigarettes can be characterized as either "cigalikes,"
which look like traditional cigarettes, or modular vaping devices (often referred
to by the acronym VTM for "vapors, tanks, and mods"), which come in various
shapes and sizes. While cigalikes, in turn, come in both disposable and
rechargeable models, VTMs generally allow greater user customization.
For all electronic cigarettes, the key component is a heating device that
atomizes or "vaporizes" a fluid that usually contains nicotine and flavoring of
114. See Daniela Saitta et al., Achieving Appropriate Regulations for Electronic
Cigarettes, 5 THERAPEUTIC ADVANCES IN CHRONIC DISEASE 50, 57 (2014) ("[T]he growing popularity
of e-cigarettes is a threat to the interests of the tobacco industry, the pharmaceutical industry and to their
associated stakeholders due to the substantial decrease in cigarette consumption and NRT sales.").
115. See David B. Abrams, Promise and Peril of e-Cigarettes, 311 J. AM. MED.
ASS'N 135 (2014).
116. Cahn & Siegel, supra note 1, at 17.
117. Abrams, supra note 115, at 136; see also id. at 135 ("[T]he increasing evidence
to date points to an opportunity of a new class of safer, but very appealing, nicotine delivery
technologies that could favor the speedy obsolescence of conventional cigarettes.").
118. Id.
119. See Peter Hajek et aL., Electronic Cigarettes: Review of Use, Content, Safety,
Effects on Smokers and Potential for Harm and Benefit, 109 ADDICTION 1801 (2014); Barbara Demick,
A High Tech Approach to Getting a Nicotine Fix, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2009),
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/25/world/fg-china-cigarettes25. Various patents for smokeless
delivery of nicotine were filed as early as 1965. See Jordan Paradise, No Sisyphean Task: How the FDA
Can Regulate Electronic Cigarettes, 13 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 326, 352-53 (2013).
120. See Hajek et aL., supra note 119, at 1801.
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some sort; the user then inhales the vapor (hence the name "vaping"). 121
Almost anything can be transformed into breathable vapor this way. There is a
growing market for flavors and assorted devices that allow users to "vape." As
of early 2014, the domestic e-cigarette market was estimated to be worth $2.2
billion, with the cigalike and VTM markets valued at $1.4 billion and $800
million, respectively.122 By 2015, estimated sales of electronic cigarettes and
associated paraphernalia hit $3.5 billion.123
For smokers who would like to quit smoking but still receive doses of
nicotine, e-cigarettes are a major potential substitute.124 E-cigarettes can look
like cigarettes, produce a vapor that shares the mouth feel of smoking, and
involve the same hand-to-mouth process, but avoid the health hazards caused
by the byproducts of combustion, such as tar and other substances.125 While e-
cigarettes cannot be characterized as "risk-free," they appear to be far less risky
to users than conventional cigarettes, and may be less risky than various forms
of smokeless tobacco as well.126 Smokers who do not wish to quit smoking may
use e-cigarettes in locations where they need to reduce secondhand smoke. It is
thus no surprise that many e-cigarette users are smokers or former smokers,
127
and it appears that at least some use e-cigarettes to reduce their overall cigarette
consumption or to help them quit.
The newness of the industry means it does not have an extensive financial
history. Wells Fargo Securities produces detailed analyses of the markets for
traditional tobacco and e-cigarettes. It estimated world e-cigarette revenues for
manufacturers at a half billion dollars in 2012. That almost tripled by 2013 and
121. See Cahn & Siegel, supra note 1, at 17; Hajek et aL., supra note 119, at 1801.
122. See Equity Research: Vape Shops-Springing Up Across the Country, WELLS
FARGO SEC. 2 (Apr. 14, 2014), available at
http://www.vaporworldexpo.com/PDFs/Tobacco %20Vape Shop Visit Apri 2014.pdf; see also Equity
Research-Tobacco Talk: Vapors/Tanks Driving Next Wave ofE-Vapor Growth, WELLS FARGO SEC.
(Mar. 24, 2014), available at
http://www.vaporworldexpo.com/PDFs/Tobacco Talk Vapors Tanks %20March%202014.pdf
(discussing growth of VTM market); Equity Research-Tobacco: Vapor World Expo, WELLS FARGO
SEC. (May 12, 2014), available at
http://www.vaporworldexpo.com/PDFs/Vapor World Expo Key Takeaways.pdf (same).
123. Jilian Mincer, The US. Vaporizer Market Is Booming, Bus. INSIDER (July 29
2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/r-in-rise-of-us-vape-shops-owners-eye-new-marijuana-market
-2015-7.
124. See Cahn & Siegel, supra note 1.
125. Hajek et aL., supra note 119, at 1806.
126. The health evidence will be discussed more below. For an overview favorable to
the e-cigarette industry, see Joel L. Nitzkin, E-Cigarette Primer for State and Local Lawmakers, R ST.
INST. (2014), http://www.rstreet.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/RSTREET25.pdf.
127. See, e.g., Sarah F. Adkinson et al., Electronic Nicotine Delivery Systems:
International Tobacco Control Four-Country Survey, 44 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 207, 208 (2013); Use
of Electronic Cigarettes (Vapourisers) Among Adults in Great Britain, ACTION ON SMOKING & HEALTH
(May 2015), http://www.ash.org.uk/files/documents/ASH 891.pdf. Both studies, like many others, find
the overwhelming majority of e-cigarette users to be current or former cigarette smokers.
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may reach $20 billion by 2021. In less than a decade, profits from e-
cigarettes could eclipse profits from traditional cigarettes.
Not surprisingly, the major tobacco producers saw the need to respond to
this new competition. They did this by developing (or acquiring) their own
electronic cigarette brands,129 as well as by supporting regulation that could
reduce the threat posed by this disruptive technology.130 Existing tobacco
companies have "war chests of cash to invest," a distribution system tied to
tobacco retailers, expertise in building brands, and deep knowledge of tobacco
consumers.13 1 The CEO of Reynolds uses e-cigarettes and has suggested they
are a large part of Reynolds' future.13 2 At the same time, Reynolds has called
for the FDA to prohibit "open-system" vapor e-cigarettes (i.e. VTMs), which
are primarily made by smaller companies and allow consumers to mix inputs to
customize their vapor devices. 133
The Wells Fargo analysis makes reasonable assumptions: e-cigarettes are
substitutes for conventional cigarettes, and consumers are now learning about
e-cigarettes and how they work as substitutes. The e-cigarettes model will be
much like the razor and razor blade model: the razor handle has a small profit
margin, made up for by higher margins on razor refills. Similarly, the cartridges
for e-cigarettes and VTM e-liquids could have higher margins than starter kits
or vaping devices in which cartridges or fluid may be used. Many VTM users
also appear to be former cigarette smokers who switched because VTMs offer a
"superior vaping experience."'134
128. Equity Research: e-Cigarettes Revolutionizing the Tobacco Industry, WELLS
FARGO SEC. 2 (June 12, 2013), available at http://www.smallcapfinancialwire.com/wp
-content/uploads/2013/11 /E-Cigs-Revolutionizing-the-Tobacco-Industry-Interactive-Model.pdf. More
recent figures indicate the growth of e-cigarettes is not as meteoric as was thought. See Tripp Mickle,
Reynolds's New Cigarette Merely Heats Tobacco, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 17, 2014),
http://online.wsj .com/articles/reynolds-american-plans-new-cigarette-which-wont-burn-tobacco
-1416256130.
129. See WELLS FARGO SEC., supra note 128, at 1 (discussing efforts by "Big 3"
cigarette companies to compete in e-cigarette market).
130. See infra Section IV.B.
131. WELLS FARGO SEC., supra note 128, at 1.
132. Mike Esterl, A Tobacco CEO Who 'Vapes' Could Alter the Industry, WALL ST.
J. (July 14, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/a-tobacco-ceo-who-vapes-could-alter-the-industry
-1405297837.
133. Richard Craver, Reynolds American Wants FDA to Ban Vapor e-Cigarettes,
WINSTON-SALEM J. (Sept. 7, 2014),
http://www.journalnow.com/business/business-news/local/reynolds-american-wants-fda-to-ban-vapor
-e-cigarettes/article 77b131f5-540d-5f02-927c-733bac751529.html. For a copy of Reynolds's official
comments on the proposed rule, see RAI Services Co., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule to Deem
Tobacco Products Subject to Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (Aug. 8, 2014),
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D FDA-2014-N-0189-76048. Reynolds is also launching
a cigarette that heats, not burns tobacco, in an effort to keep cigarette smokers who are not keen on e-
cigarettes but would like a safer product. See Mickle, supra note 128.
134. Ted Cooper, Why a Major e-Cigarette Company Is Lobbying for More
Regulation, MOTLEY FOOL (Sept. 17, 2014), http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/09/17/why-a
-major-e-cigarette-company-is-lobbying-for-mo.aspx.
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As often occurs in an emerging industry, particularly one based on a
disruptive technology, there is rapid change in the position of firms. As of
2013, there were as many as three hundred companies in the United States
selling mostly Chinese-made e-cigarettes, many over the Internet.135 In 2012,
Ballantyne Brands' Mistic e-cigarette was the leader in domestic unit sales and
second in revenue.136 By early 2013, NJOY had become the leader in both
categories, but by May of that year it was overtaken by Lorillard's blu brand.
By the summer of 2014, Logic (Logic Technologies) was number one in
convenience store sales (24.3 percent).13  At that time, the top four firms
accounted for approximately ninety percent of sales and revenue. In this sense,
the market is like the domestic cigarette market, which is dominated by what
was the Big 3 - Reynolds, Lorillard, and Altria - and is now the Big 2 since
Reynolds and Lorillard merged. Unlike the cigarette market, which has severe
restrictions on entry of new competition and marketing practices, however, the
e-cigarette market has been wide open with many entrants. In 2015, yet another
market leader emerged, as Reynolds' Vuse brand became the top-selling
electronic cigarette brand, even as sales of VTMs continued to increase.138 By
2015, there were an estimated 8,500 "vape shops" in the United States, in
addition to online vendors of VTMs. 13 9 Sales from such sources are difficult to
track and are not always included in industry sales estimates.
140
The dominant tobacco companies have sought to maintain the profitability
of their core business and enter into the growing e-cigarette market - albeit on
terms that work to the large manufacturers' comparative advantage.
141
Cigarettes are particularly profitable, as Altria and Reynolds are protected from
competition by the MSA. Domestically, however, these companies face a
shrinking market as a declining and aging share of the population smokes.
From 2005 to 2014, the percent of the population that smokes declined from
135. See Shannon Bond, Big Tobacco Bets a Packet on e-Cigarettes, FIN. TIMES
(June 6, 2013), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/lbee7f5c-cec6-l1 e2-ae25-00144feab7de.html.
136. See Bea Quirk, Smokers' Market Enjoys a Breath of Fresh Air, CHARLOTTE
Bus. J. (Sept. 12, 2014), http://www.bizjournals.com/charlotte/print-edition/2014/09/12/smokers
-market-enjoys-a-breath-of-fresh-air.html.
137. Melissa Vonder Haar, In Face ofe-Cigarette Challenges, Logic Rises to No. 1,
CSP DAILY NEWS (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.cspnet.com/category-news/tobacco/articles/face-e
-cigarette-challenges-logic-rises-no- 1.
138. See Melissa Vonder Haar, Nielsen: Electronic Cigarette Sales Growth Declines,
TOBACCO E-NEWS (Aug. 18, 2015), http://www.cspnet.com/category-news/tobacco/articles/nielsen
-electronic-cigarette-sales-growth-declines.
139. See Mincer, supra note 123.
140. See Vonder Haar, supra note 138 (noting the difficulty of accounting for vape
shop and online sales).
141. Nicotine gum and nicotine patches, generally used by people wanting to quit
smoking, were developed by pharmaceutical firms; the nicotine is a tobacco extract, but the delivery
mechanism and distribution is distinct from tobacco sales and dominated by a separate industry. The
advantage for the Big 2 (formerly the Big 3) is their distribution expertise and network that can be
employed for e-cigarettes.
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20.9 percent to 16.8 percent.14 2 Industry analysts believe the fall in cigarette
sales will continue and recent data suggest they are correct: for example,
Lorillard's domestic shipments of traditional cigarettes fell 1.9 percent in the
third quarter of 2014.143 Altria is similarly seen as threatened by "deeper
secular declines in U.S. cigarettes than anticipated."'
144
Insofar as e-cigarettes are a substitute for traditional cigarettes, cigarette
makers would be expected to attempt to participate in the e-cigarette market.
Financial analysts following the cigarette industry make clear their view that
the major cigarette companies must be in the e-cigarette market and may come
to dominate it. Lorillard, the smallest of what was the Big 3, had a top-selling
e-cigarette, blu, that it acquired in 2012.145 Reynolds introduced Vuse in 2013,
which it markets as a superior quality product that will have less of an impact
on the environment than traditional cigarettes.14 6 Philip Morris International
bought Nicocigs, one of the U.K.'s largest e-cigarette makers, in 2014.147 Altria
launched MarkTen e-cigarettes nationally in 2014 and also bought an
independent firm, Green Smoke.148 Lorillard bought one of the largest e-
cigarette companies in the U.K. 14 9 Industry analysts are not surprised by such
investments, as some forecast that sales revenues from e-cigarettes could
surpass sales revenues from cigarettes sometime between 2017 and 2023.
Cigarette sales are falling; meanwhile, e-cigarette sales are growing rapidly and
142. Current Cigarette Smoking Among Adults in the United States, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Jan. 23, 2015),
www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data statistics/fact sheets/adult ata/cig smoking. The share of adults aged 19-
24 who smoke is about ten percent lower than for the rest of the adult population.
143. Lorillard Growth Comparisons, CSIMARKET,
http://csimarket.com/stocks/growthrates.php?code LO (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
144. BANK OF AM.-MERRILL LYNCH, ALTRIA GROUP 2 (May 7, 2014) (on file with
the Yale Journal on Regulation).
145. Lorillard trumpeted its move into the e-cigarette market by its purchase of blu in
2012, as its press release indicates. Press Release, Lorillard Inc., Lorillard Inc. Reports First Quarter
2012 Results and Acquisition of blu E-cigs (Apr. 25, 2012), http://investors.lorillard.com/investor-
relations/news/news-details/2012/Lorillard-Inc-Reports-First-Quarter-20 1 -Results-and-Acquisition-of-
blu-ecigs/default.aspx. Lorillard agreed to sell blu to Imperial Tobacco in 2014 as part of the merger of
Lorillard with Reynolds. Even without the merger issue, the divestiture of blu suggests that the period of
glory for blu may have been temporary due to consumers' move toward open systems. Rapid change in
technology is not uncommon in emerging markets. See Rich Duprey, Is This the Real Reason Lorillard
Is Willing to Sell blu Cigs, THE MOTLEY FOOL (Aug. 19, 2014),
http://www.fool.com/investing/generalU2014/08/19/is-this-the-real-reason-lorillard-is-willing-to-se.aspx.
146. For a copy of the advertisement, see VUSE VAPOR,
https://vusevapor.com/modules/Security/Landing.aspx (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
147. Ese Erheriene, Philip Morris Strikes UK. e-cigarette Deal, WALL ST. J. (June
26, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/philip-morris-strikes-u-k-e-cigarette-dea-1403783669.
148. Mike Esterl, Altria Expands in e-Cigarettes with Green Smoke, WALL ST. J.
(Feb. 3, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304626804579360552508696542;
Mike Esterl, Altria to Launch MarkTen e-Cigarette Nationally, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 19, 2014),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 10001424052702304914204579393083711733854.
149. Lorillard bought SKYCIG, a U.K. e-cigarette company, in 2013. Press Release,
Lorillard, Inc. Acquires British-based SKYCIG, Expanding its Electronic Cigarette Business (Oct. 1,
2013), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/lorillard-inc-acquires-british-based-skycig
-expanding-its-electronic-cigarette-business-225948541 .html.
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thus could become the primary income and profit source for Altria and
Reynolds. Even if such projections are overly optimistic, the moves being made
by the two dominant firms and investments by independent e-cigarette makers
indicate that the market for e-cigarettes is expected to grow. The big tobacco
companies continue to be profitable and are considered, at least by some
analysts, to be good investments, particularly after the FDA's decision to
regulate e-cigarettes as tobacco products.1
50
B. E-Cigarettes and Public Health
E-cigarettes mimic traditional tobacco products, but they do not produce
smoke and do not involve combustion. For these reasons, "vaping" is likely to
pose a lower risk to e-cigarette users and third-parties than smoking.'
15
Preliminary research on e-cigarettes supports this conclusion.I1 2 For this
reason, some public health experts and organizations like the Royal College of
Physicians believe e-cigarettes can represent a form of "harm reduction" for
tobacco.153 Some anti-smoking groups, on the other hand, fear that widespread
"vaping" could renormalize smoking, prolong rates of nicotine addiction,
encourage teen tobacco use, and pose additional health threats that have not yet
been uncovered. 1
54
While much is still unknown about the full public health effects of e-
cigarettes, the evidence to date suggests that e-cigarettes are substantially less
dangerous than traditional tobacco products, cigarettes in particular. 15 Tar and
150. See, e.g., Rupert Hargreaves, Tobacco is Still an Extremely Profitable Business,
and This Won't Change Soon, MOTLEY FOOL (Apr. 8, 2014),
http://www.fool.com/investing/generaU/20 14/04/08/tobacco-is-still-an-extremely-profitable-busines
-2.aspx; Penny Morgan, 2Q15 Revenue Results of Tobacco Companies Sent Strong Signals, MKT
REALIST (Dec. 21, 2015), http://marketrealist.com/2015/12/3ql5-revenue-results-of-tobacco-companies-
sent-strong-signals; Bentley, supra note 4.
151. Cahn & Siegel, supra note 1, at 17 ("Theoretically, we would expect vaping to
be less harmful than smoking as it delivers nicotine without the thousands of known and unknown
toxicants in tobacco smoke.").
152. See, e.g., Hajek et al., supra note 119; A. McNeill et al., E-Cigarettes. An
Evidence Update-A Report Commissioned by Public Health England, PUB. HEALTH ENG. (2015),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment data/file/457102/Ecigarettes n e
vidence update A report commissioned by Public Health England FINAL.pdf.
153. See, e.g., Cahn & Siegel, supra note 1; McNeill et al., supra note 152, at 14;
ROYAL COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS. NICOTINE WITHOUT SMOKE: TOBACCO HARM REDUCTION (2016),
https://www.rcplondon.ac.uk/proj ects/outputs/nicotine-without-smoke-tobacco-harm-reduction-0
(urging encouragement of e-cigarettes and other tobacco alternatives as a means of curbing smoking).
154. See infra notes 175-181 and accompanying text.
155. See Cahn & Siegel, supra note 1, at 18 ("Although the existing research does not
warrant a conclusion that electronic cigarettes are safe in absolute terms and further clinical studies are
needed to comprehensively assess the safety of electronic cigarettes, a preponderance of the available
evidence shows them to be much safer than tobacco cigarettes and comparable in toxicity to
conventional nicotine replacement products."). See generally Hajek et al., supra note 119 (concluding
that e-cigarettes are likely to be much less harmful to users and bystanders than cigarettes); McNeill et
al., supra note 152, at 80 ("While vaping may not be 100% safe, most of the chemicals causing
smoking-related disease are absent and the chemicals that are present pose limited danger.").
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other chemicals inhaled when smoking cigarettes are a cause of lung cancer and
other health problems associated with smoking.156 E-cigarettes eliminate these
chemicals, which are the primary health dangers to smokers. The problems
caused by secondhand smoke are also greatly reduced because -cigarettes
produce vapor, as opposed to smoke, and do not deliver "side-stream"
smoke.15 7 Most e-cigarettes deliver measured doses of nicotine, the addictive
substance in tobacco to users. The levels of nicotine delivered in cigarettes and
e-cigarettes are not toxic, however.158 Users also can, depending on the brand
purchased, choose the dose level preferred.159 Furthermore, some e-cigarette
products are available that lack any nicotine content.Various smoking cessation
products, such as gums, lozenges and other NRTs, also contain nicotine.
A comprehensive report about e-cigarettes produced by Public Health
England (the research arm of the UK's Department of Health), found e-
cigarettes significantly less harmful than other tobacco products. 16 A follow-up
report in 2015, surveying the available medical research, reaffirmed this
conclusion.16 1 A separate international expert panel evaluating the relative
harms posed by various nicotine-containing products concluded that e-
cigarettes pose no more than five percent of the risk posed by traditional
cigarettes.16 2 Some preliminary studies also appear to show relatively rapid
health benefits for smokers who switch from cigarettes to e-cigarettes.163 One
156. Cigarette smoking is estimated to cause almost a half million deaths annually;
about ten percent of those are from secondhand smoke. See Tobacco-Related Mortality, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Feb. 6, 2014),
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data statistics/fact sheets/health effects/tobacco related mortality; see
also Saitta et al., supra note 114, at 53 ("[N]early all the health risks come from tar, chemicals, and other
substances found in the smoke, not from nicotine." (citation omitted)).
157. See McNeill et al., supra note 152, at 76 (noting that "the health risks of passive
exposure to electronic cigarette vapour are likely to be extremely low"). Side-stream smoke is one
component of secondhand smoke. Different from mainstream smoke, which is secondhand smoke that is
exhaled by a smoker, side-stream smoke is produced by the combusting tip of a cigarette or other
tobacco product. See Health Risks of Secondhand Smoke, AM. CANCER SOC'Y,
http://www.cancer.org/cancer/cancercauses/tobaccocancer/secondhand-smoke (last updated Nov. 13,
2015).
158. The WHO attack on e-cigarettes resulted in backlash. A large number of health
researchers replied to WHO that e-cigarettes could be a tobacco harm reducer. See Letter from
Specialists in Nicotine Science and Public Health Policy to Dr. Margaret Chan, Dir.-Gen., World Health
Org. (May 26, 2014), http://nicotinepolicy-net/documents/letters/MargaretChan.pdf.
159. For example, the blu e-cigarette brand offers cartridges with a range of nicotine
levels, and also offers "Non-Nicotine" cartridges. See Flavor Cartridges, BLU,
http://www.blucigs.com/product/flavor-cartridges (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
160. John Britton & Itze Bogdanovica, Electronic Cigarettes, PUB. HEALTH ENG.
(2014), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment data/file/311887
/Ecigarettes report.pdf.
161. See McNeill et al., supra note 152.
162. See David J. Nutt et al., Estimating the Harms of Nicotine-Containing Products
Using the MCDA Approach, 20 EUR. ADDICTION RES. 218 (2014). The 2015 Public Health UK report
concluded this was a "reasonable estimate." McNeill et al., supra note 152, at 80.
163. Stephen S. Hecht et al., Evaluation of Toxicant and Carcinogen Metabolites in
the Urine ofE-Cigarettes Users Versus Cigarette Smokers, 17 NICOTINE TOBACCO RES. 704 (2015);
Riccardo Polosa, Electronic Cigarette Use and Harm Reversal: Emerging Evidence in the Lung, 13
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study, for example, found significant improvements in measures such as airway
inflammation and obstruction in as little as three months.
164
Nonetheless, e-cigarettes are not risk free. Among the problems identified
by the Public Health England report are several related to quality control,
particularly with smaller brands. Some e-cigarettes are not consistent in the
level of nicotine doses delivered. The Parliament Office of Science and
Technology found e-cigarettes to be a good alternative to cigarettes from a
public health standpoint16 5 but noted that some brands of e-cigarettes tended to
be unreliable in dosage and had inadequate labels.166 Some are also concerned
that celebrity endorsement of e-cigarettes may induce usage by non-smoking
youth. 167
Most electronic cigarettes contain icotine. While nicotine can be quite
addictive, nicotine itself is not a significant source of the health problems
caused by cigarettes. Public Health England, a government agency that funds
campaigns against tobacco use, explains: "nicotine is not a significant health
hazard. Nicotine does not cause serious adverse health effects such as acute
cardiac events, coronary heart disease or cerebrovascular disease, and is not
carcinogenic." 16 8 That is, the primary health hazards from tobacco are from
substances other than nicotine. In cigarettes, a multitude of substances are
under combustion.16 9 On the other hand, as a recent review of the available
scientific literature concluded, e-cigarettes "contain some toxicants in
concentrations much lower than in tobacco smoke and negligible
concentrations of carcinogens."' 
17
0
The growth in e-cigarette usage to date seems to be an advance for public
health. The majority of e-cigarette users appear to switch to the product away
from cigarettes, thereby reducing exposure to the harmful content of cigarettes.
A survey in the U.K found that "three out of five [e-cigarette users] are current
BMC MED. 54, 54 (2015) ("[S]mokers completely switching to regular EC use are likely to gain
significant health benefits.").
164. See Polosa, supra note 163, at 56.
165. That office is akin to the Congressional Research Service (CRS) in the United
States.
166. Britton & Bogdanovica, supra note 160, at 7.
167. See, e.g., Rachel Grana et al., E-Cigarettes. A Scientific Review, 129
CIRCULATION 1972 (2014). On the question of whether e-cigarettes are a "gateway to smoking," the
evidence is lacking. See Michael B. Siegel, The e-Cigarette Gateway Myth, WALL ST. J (AUG. 5, 2014),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/michael-b-sieget-the-e-cigarette-gateway-myth-1407283557.
168. Britton & Bogdanovica, supra note 160, at 7.
169. Harmful and Potentially Harmful Constituents in Tobacco Products and Tobacco
Smoke: Established List, 77 Fed. Reg. 20034 (Apr. 3, 2012); Jeff Fowles & Erik Dybing, Application of
Toxicological Risk Assessment Principles to the Chemical Constituents of Cigarette Smoke, 12
TOBACCO CONTROL 424 (2003). The FDA lists nicotine as a reproductive or developmental toxicant and
addictive, but not a carcinogen like dozens of other chemicals identified in tobacco products and tobacco
smoke.
170. Hajek et aL., supra note 119, at 1801.
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smokers" and most of the rest are ex-smokers.' 1 Similarly, a Canadian study
found "64 per cent of those who vape also smoke. Another 27 per cent used to
smoke tobacco but quit, while 9 per cent of vapers never smoked."' 172 In this
regard, e-cigarettes and other ENDS may be a viable form of "harm
reduction." 173
No doubt more will be learned from more research. E-cigarettes are new,
so long-term health consequences cannot yet be known. The nicotine content of
e-cigarettes also varies more than is likely acceptable.174 Health issues may
well be attached to the use of e-cigarettes,' 1 but, based on the evidence to date,
the dangers appear to be much smaller than those posed by tobacco use.
Nonetheless, there is virulent opposition to e-cigarettes from a variety of health
researchers and advocacy groups who would, at a minimum, like e-cigarettes to
be subject to strong regulation and taxation so as to discourage their use. These
public health advocates are the Baptists in our story.176
C. Regulating E-Cigarettes
Prior to 2016, e-cigarettes were not subject to federal regulation as
currently marketed and sold. As noted above, the FDA had sought to regulate
e-cigarettes as drug-device combinations, only to have that effort rejected in
federal court.17 7 Under current law, e-cigarettes are only subject to regulation
171. Use of Electronic Cigarettes in Great Britain, ACTION ON SMOKING AND
HEALTH (May 2015), http://www.ash.org.uk/files/documents/ASH 891.pdf
172. Andre Picard, Ex-Smokers Credit E-Cigarettes for Helping Them Quit, Poll
Finds, THE GLOBE & MAIL (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/life/health-and
-fitness/health/ex-smokers-credit-e-cigarettes-for-helping-them-quit-poll-finds/article22135601. Other
surveys also find most e-cigarette users to be current or former cigarette smokers. Zachary Cahn &
Michael Siegel, Electronic Cigarettes as a Harm Reduction Strategy for Tobacco Control, 32 J. PUB.
HEALTH POL'Y 15, 16, 26 (2011) ("[E]lectronic cigarettes show tremendous promise in the fight against
tobacco-related morbidity and mortality.").
173. See Cahn & Siegel, supra note 1; Michael L. Marlow, Regulating a Less
Unhealthy Cigarette, REG., Fall 2014, at 28; Nicole D. White, E-Cigarettes for Smoking Cessation:
Helpful or Harmful, 9 AM. J. LIFESTYLE MED. 109 (2014); ROYAL COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS, supra note
153.
174. Joseph G. Lisko et al., Chemical Composition and Evaluation of Nicotine,
Tobacco Alkaloids, pH, and Selected Flavors in e-Cigarette Cartridges and Refill Solutions, 10
NICOTINE TOBACCO RES. 17 (2015).
175. Most e-cigarette opponents attack the product as a gateway to tobacco use or
assert that nicotine use is a danger. The vaping process itself may involve some hazards. See R. Paul
Jensen et al., Hidden Formaldehyde in e-Cigarette Aerosols, 372 NEw ENG. J. MED. 392 (2015).
176. An interesting twist has arisen in the analysis of tobacco regulations. The FDA
has recognized, perhaps for the first time formally, that some smokers like smoking, so consideration
should be given to the pleasure they receive from it. That point is obvious but has generally been
dismissed as irrelevant when discussing something that has negative health effects. For an analysis of
the FDA regulation in question, see Deeming Tobacco Products to Be Subject to FDCA, supra note 1.
For news coverage of the controversy, see Sabrina Tavernise, In New Calculus on Smoking, It's Health
Gained vs. Pleasure Lost, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/07/health/pleasure-factor-may-override-new-tobacco-rumles.htrn.
177. See Sottera, Inc. v. FDA, 627 F.3d 891, 893 (D.C. Cir. 2010); see also supra
notes 110-113 and accompanying text.
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as drug-devices if they are advertised or sold for therapeutic uses. As this
would entail going through an extensive regulatory approval process, no e-
cigarette maker markets and sells e-cigarettes in this fashion. If e-cigarettes are
to be regulated under existing federal law, it can only occur under the Family
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009.
In May 2016, the FDA asserted its authority to regulate e-cigarettes by
deeming e-cigarettes containing nicotine to be "tobacco products" subject to
FDA authority.' The resulting regulations define the next e-cigarette
regulatory environment. Under these regulations, ales to minors are prohibited
and advertising and promotional efforts are limited. The rules also subject e-
cigarettes to stringent premarket review requirements. As noted above, these
requirements apply to all tobacco products that are not substantially equivalent
to products that were marketed before 2007, at which time there were few e-
cigarettes on the market. These policy changes will increase the cost of
bringing new cigarette alternatives to market while still offering opportunities
to expand the market and establish new brands.17 9 Moreover, the FDA appears
to be applying the "substantial equivalent" requirement quite stringently,
imposing significant costs on producers that will be borne most readily by
larger firms. These requirements are likely to impose substantial burdens on
smaller manufacturers and distributors and further enhance the competitive
advantage of traditional cigarette manufacturers that seek to make inroads
within the e-cigarette market.
The FDA's new regulations do not address the MSA revenue problem or
the federal tobacco tax problem, however. To bring e-cigarettes under the MSA
will require actions by the state attorneys general deeming e-cigarettes as
cigarettes under the agreement because they "contain ... tobacco," insofar as
they contain nicotine that is derived from tobacco, and are "heated under
ordinary conditions of use." If e-cigarettes are to be subject to federal excise
taxes now applied to tobacco products, Congressional action will be required.
Thus, it is unlikely that the FDA's new regulations will end the jockeying to
define the e-cigarette regulatory framework.
The FDA is not the only regulator of e-cigarettes and other tobacco
alternatives. Many state and local governments have begun to regulate e-
cigarettes sale and use, either as part of existing smoking regulations or
separately enacted rules. 80 State legislatures have also begun to consider
whether e-cigarettes and other cigarette alternatives should be subject to
tobacco taxes or substitute levies.
178. Deeming Tobacco Products to Be Subject to FDCA, supra note 1.
179. See Mickle, supra note 2 (citing estimated costs of $2 million to $10 million per
product for premarket approval).
180. See Tripp Mickle, States Dash to Regulate E-Cigarettes, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 30,
2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/states-dash-to-regulate-e-cigarettes-1422668141; States and
Municipalities with Laws Regulating Use of Electronic Cigarettes, AM. NONSMOKERS' RTS. FOUND.
(Apr. 4, 2016), www.no-smoke.org/pdf/ecigslaws.pdf.
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IV. Baptists, Bootleggers & E-Cigarettes
The chaotic competitiveness of the rapidly growing e-cigarette dispensing
industry is not surprising. When there is new low-cost technology, start-up
firms enter, exit, and, in some cases, become acquired by more seasoned
competitors. We doubt that the current competitiveness will be the industry
equilibrium. All firms prefer cartels that coordinate pricing and output to
chaotic competition. Firms that are already a part of a Bootlegger/Baptist
agreement with regulators will surely seek to enlist new, worrisome
competitors into the cartel camp. As discussed more below, e-cigarette
producers, be they newly formed firms or members of the Big 2, could be lured
or dragooned into the MSA fold, as some members of Congress have already
suggested.I81 This is a possibility because critically important interest groups
have much to gain by making e-cigarette producers contributors to MSA
revenues. In particular, a coalition of Bootleggers and Baptists who prefer to
see greater regulation of and rent extraction from e-cigarettes could seek to
draw traditional cigarettes' greatest competitive threat into the MSA cartel.
In the case of e-cigarettes, a Bootleggers and Baptists coalition is forming.
As we discuss next, the coalition is composed of the tobacco companies
(Bootleggers) and makers of nicotine replacement therapies that see their
markets threatened by a new product. Some public health advocates (Baptists)
oppose e-cigarettes and wish to see them strictly regulated or prohibited. State
governments, that enjoy tobacco tax revenue and have sold bonds backed by
tobacco tax revenue now threatened by the decline in cigarette sales, are also
Bootleggers. Alone, each interest may be too weak to control the future of the
e-cigarette market, but the coalition of diverse interests, even if not directly
collaborative, could well impose significant controls on e-cigarettes.
A. Baptists: Those Who Want E-cigarettes Regulated or Banned
Private and public health officials have long assailed cigarettes, as the
MSA attests. They are the Baptists in this story-those concerned for the health
of others. Many anti-smoking groups, such as the Campaign for Tobacco-Free
Kids, have called for greater regulation of e-cigarettes including, but not
limited to, measures to control access to such products by children.182
181. Press Release, H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, Democratic Leaders Urge
State Attorneys General to Bring e-Cigarettes Under Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement (Feb. 12,
2014). This call for action was reiterated late in 2014. See Press Release, H. Comm. on Energy &
Commerce, Democratic Leaders Urge FDA Action, Call for State Attorneys General to Classify e-
cigarettes Under the Master Settlement Agreement (Dec. 19, 2014).
182. See E-Cigarettes and Lung Health, AM. LUNG ASS'N (2015),
http://www.lung.org/stop-smoking/tobacco-control-advocacy/federal/e-cigarettes.htm; Matthew L.
Meyers, FDA Oversight is Key to Minimizing Risks of e-Cigarettes, Especially to Kids, and Realizing
Potential, CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS (Oct. 24, 2015)
http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/tobacco unfiltered/tag/e-cigarettes; Position Statement on Electronic
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Past anti-smoking coalitions, including the iconic American Heart
Association, American Cancer Association, and American Lung Association
have been successful in lobbying for legislative and regulatory changes that
restrict advertising and marketing practices, especially when their sought-after
changes have accommodated the long-run strategies of dominant tobacco
industry bootleggers. Only now, the debate is a bit more complex than past
struggles that had to do with limiting the sale of cigarettes to young people.
After all, e-cigarettes can be viewed as forming an avenue that reduces
smoking.
Based on what is known about the health effects of e-cigarette use, it
would seem e-cigarettes might be hailed as an advance in public health insofar
as they attract cigarette smokers to a safer product. Even small reductions in the
number of smokers or even in the amount of tobacco products that smokers
consume, would likely produce substantial gains for public health. Yet e-
cigarettes have been greeted with scorn in some quarters or, at a minimum,
suspicion, by health researchers. Even those that acknowledge the potential
benefits of e-cigarettes call for increased federal regulation.
83
Critics of e-cigarettes note that little is known about the health effects of
these products, and long-term effects in particular. As the FDA acknowledged
when proposing its deeming rule, the agency does "not currently have sufficient
data about hese products to determine what effects e-cigarettes have on public
health."'' 8 4 Some studies have confirmed that e-cigarettes themselves or e-
cigarette vapor do contain potentially dangerous substances, even if at lower
levels than are found in cigarette smoke. 15 Therefore, some researchers are
Cigarettes [ECs] or Electronic Nicotine Delivery Systems [ENDs], INT'L UNION AGAINST
TUBERCULOSIS & LUNG DISEASE, (Oct. 2013), http://www.theunion.org/what-we
-do/publications/officiallbody/E-cigarette statement FULL.pdf; see also infra notes 184-90 and
accompanying text (discussing health concerns about use of e-cigarettes).
183. See, e.g., Aruni Bhatnagar et al., Electronic Cigarettes: A Policy Statement from
the American Heart Association, 130 CIRCULATION 1418 (2014).
184. Deeming Tobacco Products to Be Subject to FDCA, supra note 2, at 23144. In
the Federal Register notice accompanying the final rule, the FDA disclaimed any legal obligation to
only deem products where such action is necessary to protect public health, but also argued that
"regulation of the newly deemed products will be beneficial to public health." Deeming Tobacco
Products to Be Subject to FDCA, supra note 1, at 28983.
185. See, e.g., Vicky Yu et al., Electronic Cigarettes Induce DNA Strand Breaks and
Cell Death Independently of Nicotine in Cell Lines, 52 ORAL ONCOLOGY 58 (2015) (finding that e-
cigarette vapor is potentially cytotoxic). In response to news reports, the study authors noted, "Contrary
to what was stated or implied in much of the news coverage resulting from this news release, the lab
experiments did not find that e-cigarette vapor was as harmful to cells as cigarette smoke. In fact, one
phase of the experiments, not addressed in the news release, found that cigarette smoke did in fact kill
cells at a much faster rate." Press Release, Veterans Affairs Research Commc'ns, Cell Harm Seen in
Lab Tests of F-Cigarettes (Dec. 28, 2015), http://www.eurekalert.org/pub releases/2015-12/varc-
chs122815.php; see also Joseph G. Allen et al., Flavoring Chemicals in e-Cigarettes. Diacetyl, 2,3-
Pentanedione, and Acetoin in a Sample of 51 Products, Including Fruit-, Candy-, and Cocktail-Flavored
e-Cigarettes, 2015 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1 (finding presence of contaminant linked to "popcorn
lung"); R. Paul Jensen et al., Hidden Formaldehyde in e-Cigarette Aerosols, 372 N. ENG. J. MED. 392
(2015). But see Clive D. Bates & Konstantinos F. Farsalinos, Research Letter on e-Cigarette Cancer
Risk Was So Misleading It Should Be Retracted, 110 ADDICTION 1686 (2015); Michael Siegel, New
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concerned that e-cigarettes may turn out to be more dangerous than some
suppose, or may replace the risks of smoking with other risks.186 Additionally,
given the degree of innovation and churn within the industry, there is relatively
little standardization of products, especially among smaller producers. Thus,
even if the most commonly marketed e-cigarettes are generally safe, the same
may not be so of products made by independent producers or individual vape
shops.187 There are also independent concerns about he safety, labeling, and
packaging of nicotine-containing vaping fluid sold in bottles or cartridges.1
88
A particularly powerful concern is that e-cigarette use could encourage
nicotine addiction and either prolong nicotine addiction among smokers that
might otherwise have quit or serve as a "gateway" to use of traditional tobacco
products, among children especially.189 Dr. Tom Frieden of the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), for example, opposes e-cigarettes
because he believes they will attract young people, who will then migrate to
cigarettes, and that e-cigarettes will also lead former smokers back to
smoking.190 The 2014 National Youth Tobacco Survey found that e-cigarette
use among high school students increased substantially from 2013 to 2014.191
At the same time, cigarette and cigar use among high school students declined
significantly.192 As the CDC noted, 2014 was the first year in which teen use of
Study Finds that Average Diacetyl Exposure from Vaping is 750 Times Lower than from Smoking, THE
REST OF THE STORY: TOBACCO ANALYSIS & COMMENT. (Dec. 10, 2015, 9:37 AM),
http://tobaccoanalysis.blogspot.com/2015/12/new-study-finds-that-average-diacetyl.html.
186. See, e.g., M. Zeller & D. Hatsukami, The Strategic Dialogue on Tobacco Harm
Reduction. A Vision and Blueprintfor Action in the U.S., 18 TOBACCO CONTROL 324 (2009).
187. Some critics are particularly concerned about the quality control of vaping fluid
and e-cigarette components imported from China. See Matt Richtel, Selling a Poison by the Barrel.
Liquid Nicotine for e-Cigarettes, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/24/business/selling-a-poison-by-the-barrel-liquid-nicotine-for-e
-cigarettes.html (discussing quality control problems with imported vaping fluid). Ssee generally David
Barboza, China's e-Cigarette Boom Lacks Oversight for Safety, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/14/business/internationallchinas-e-cigarette-boom-lacks-oversight-
for-safety-html (discussing concerns about lack of oversight of imported e-cigarette products, including
vaping fluid).
188. These concerns have led to the FDA considering a regulation that would
specifically address the safety of nicotine-containing fluid. See Nicotine Exposure Warnings and Child-
Resistant Packaging for Liquid Nicotine, Nicotine-Containing E-Liquid(s), and Other Tobacco products;
Request for Comments, 80 Fed. Reg. 37,555 (proposed July 1, 2015).
189. Kelvin Choi & Jean Forster, Characteristics Associated with Awareness,
Perceptions, and Use of Electronic Nicotine Delivery Systems Among Young US. Midwestern Adults,
103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 556 (2013); Lauren M. Dutra & Stanton A. Glantz, Electronic Cigarettes and
Conventional Cigarette Use Among US. Adolescents, 168 J. AM. MED. ASS'N PEDIATRICS 610 (2014);
see also John P. Pierce, Harm Reduction or Harm Maintenance?, 4 NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES. S53
(2002) (discussing concerns with harm reduction approach to tobacco use).
190. Karen Kaplan, CDC Director Explains What He Hates About Electronic
Cigarettes, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/science/sciencenow/la-sci-sn-why-tom
-frieden-hates-electronic-cigarettes-cdc-20140429-story.html.
191. Rene A. Arrazola et al., Tobacco Use Among Middle and High School
Students-United States, 2011-2014, 64 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 381, 383 (Apr. 17,
2015).
192. Id; see also Jacob Sullum, Smoking and Vaping Keep Moving in Opposite
Directions, REASON: HIT & RUN BLOG (Apr. 16, 2015, 10:31 PM),
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e-cigarettes was greater than teen use of traditional tobacco products.'93 One
possible explanation of this trend is that teens who would otherwise have
smoked cigarettes are using e-cigarettes instead.194 Interestingly enough, recent
research suggests that restrictions on youth access to e-cigarettes can increase
youth smoking rates.195 This is further evidence that, at least for some users, e-
cigarettes are substitutes for traditional tobacco products.
The World Health Organization (WHO) has also expressed grave
concern.19 6 It declared early after the introduction of e-cigarettes: "Nicotine is a
highly toxic and addictive substance that poses a serious risk to health."'
197
However, as noted above, this statement is not consistent with the evidence.
Nicotine can be toxic - almost everything is at some level. WHO
recommended that e-cigarettes be regulated under tobacco laws, and that there
should be prohibitions against use in public and restrictions on advertising and
promotions.198 In 2012, WHO said more study of the matter is needed but that
controls similar to tobacco products are needed.199 Similarly, the European
Parliament recommends consistent regulation of e-cigarettes across EU
countries, including advertising restrictions, controls on product design, and
other controls similar to those on tobacco.200
http://reason.com/blog/2015/04/16/smoking-and-vaping-are-still-moving-in-o (dismissing claims that e-
cigarette use leads to tobacco use); Graham Moore, et al., Electronic-cigarette use among young people
in Wales: evidence from two cross-sectional surveys. 5 BMJ OPEN (2015)
http://bmjopen.bmj.com/content/5/4/eOO7072 ("e-cigarettes are unlikely to make a major direct
contribution to adolescent nicotine addiction.").
193. Press Release, Ctrs for Disease Control, F-Cigarette Use Triples Among Middle




194. See, e.g., Sullum, supra note 192.
195. See Abigail S. Friedman, How Does Electronic Cigarette Access Affect
Adolescent Smoking?, 44 J. HEALTH ECON. 300 (2015); Michael Pesko et al.,, The Influence of
Electronic Cigarette Age Purchasing Restrictions on Adolescent Tobacco and Marijuana Use, 2016
PREVENTIVE MEDICINE 1.
196. See Grana et al., supra note 167 (summarizing report of the WHO Tobacco Free
Initiative); see also Ann McNeill et al., A Critique of a World Health Organization-Commissioned
Report and Associated Paper on Electronic Cigarettes, 109 ADDICTION 2128 (2014) (critiquing WHO
report).
197. Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, Control and Prevention of
Smokeless Tobacco Products and Electronic Cigarettes, FCTC/COP/4/12, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 6,
(Sept. 15, 2010), http://apps.who.int/gb/fctc/PDF/cop4/FCTC OP4 12-en.pdf.
198. WHO Study Group on Tobacco Product Regulation Report on the Scientific
Basis of Tobacco Product Regulation, WORLD HEALTH ORG. TECHNICAL REP. S. 39-40 (2010),
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/44213/1/9789241209557 eng.pdf.
199. Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, Electronic Nicotine Delivery
Systems, Including Electronic Cigarettes, FCTC/COP/5/13, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (June 18, 2012),
http://apps.who.int/gb/fctc/PDF/cop5/FCTC OP5 13-en.pdf.
200. The Directive asserts that competition will be enhanced if all EU members adopt
identical regulations. Council Directive 2014/40, 2014 O.J. (L 127) 1, 7 (EC),
http://ec.europa.eu/health/tobacco/docs/dir 201440 en.pdf.
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B. Bootleggers: Those Who Profit from Restrictions on E-Cigarettes
There are substitutes in every market. E-cigarettes are a substitute for
traditional cigarettes for some smokers. This makes e-cigarettes a threat to the
traditional cigarette industry. For this reason, traditional cigarette
manufacturers have an incentive to either enter the e-cigarette market
themselves, suppress competition from upstart e-cigarette manufacturers, or
both.201 As one would predict, cigarette manufacturers have pursued both
strategies, developing or acquiring their own lines of e-cigarette products and
supporting regulatory measures that could suppress competition.
Altria, the nation's largest cigarette manufacturer and the producer of
MarkTen e-cigarettes, urged the FDA to regulate "all currently unregulated
tobacco products.20 2 Among other things, Altria urged the FDA to subject all
203such products to premarket review requirements. Such requirements will
particularly burden smaller firms and new market entrants, to the advantage of
the major cigarette producers. Reynolds has also urged greater federal
regulation and supported the FDA's assertion of authority over e-cigarettes.
Specifically, Reynolds called upon the FDA to prohibit all "open-system vapor
,,204products. Even though such systems can be used without nicotine, Reynolds
argues that such products "create unique public health risks. 20 5 Such products
also appear to be increasingly popular and to pose the greatest competitive risk
206to established market players.
Just as the MSA has served to protect the dominant cigarette
manufacturers from smaller producers and new market entrants, extensive
regulation of e-cigarettes - including limits on advertising and requirements
that new e-cigarette brands or products become subject to an extensive
permitting or pre-approval regime - may make it more difficult for newer and
smaller e-cigarette manufacturers to compete. Larger, more-established firms
will have an easier time affording and navigating such requirements than their
newer and smaller competitors. They also benefit from an existing distribution
system that is likely to give them preferential shelf space in smoke shops,
convenience stores, and the like.
Despite the lack of evidence that e-cigarette use poses significant health
risks, large cigarette manufacturers have begun to place detailed health
201. As noted above, some research already indicates that restrictions on e-cigarettes
may lead to greater smoking rates. See Friedman, supra note 195.
202. Letter from James E. Dillard I1, Senior Vice President, Regulatory Affairs,




204. Craver, supra note 133.
205. Id.
206. See Cooper, supra note 134 ("[T]he open devices are a platform for flavor
innovation that could make it difficult for big tobacco companies to keep up.").
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warnings on their e-cigarette products, including messages that warn of the
207potential dangers of nicotine. Altria, for instance, has a warning that reads, in
part, "Nicotine is addictive and habit forming, and is very toxic by inhalation,
in contact with the skin, or if swallowed.,20 8 These warnings are far more
explicit than those currently required on cigarette packages, leading some to
believe they are part of a "cynical business strategy.' 20 9 The adoption of such
labels may make the larger companies appear to be more responsible than
other, smaller companies that do not place equivalent labels on their products
and could help build support for competition-limiting regulation of e-cigarettes
- regulation that could work to larger cigarette manufacturers' advantage.
2 1
0
E-cigarettes are also a potential substitute for other products that may
satisfy smokers' desire for nicotine. Quitting smoking is not easy, so firms have
invented products to help wean smokers away from traditional cigarettes. For
some years now, nicotine gum, lozenges, patches, and inhalers (all NRTs) have
been the primary ways smokers can continue to get nicotine doses without
exposing themselves to the unhealthy side products present in traditional
cigarettes. The WHO, which is hostile to e-cigarettes as just discussed, lists
nicotine gum and patches on its essential medicines listfor "disorders due to
psychoactive substance use.",211 Many of these products are available over-the-
counter and are encouraged by public health officials.
Pharmaceutical companies that make NRT products, such as
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), are among the Bootleggers in our story. They have
benefitted from government's encouragement of smokers to use their products
to aid in smoking cessation as well as from government limitations on
information on tobacco harm reduction through the use of e-cigarettes or
smokeless tobacco products. Insofar as e-cigarettes are an alternative way for
smokers to satisfy their nicotine cravings, they are a threat to the profitability of
NRT products. This is particularly so given recent research suggesting that
NRT products do not help many smokers quit.
212





210. No doubt such a warning gladdens the CDC director who, as noted above,
greatly dislikes e-cigarettes. His agency reported that e-cigarette use among teens has increased. See
Tobacco Use Among Middle and High School Students-United States, 2013, CTRS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION (2014),
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6345a2.htm?s cid=mm6345a2 w. It should not be
surprising that experimentation with a new product is occurring. Despite experimenting with e-
cigarettes, smoking among that age group continues to decline.
211. WHO Model List of Essential Medicines, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 32 (18th ed.
2013),http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/93142/1/EML 18 eng.pdfua=l.
212. There is relatively limited evidence that NRTs are an effective means of helping
smokers to quit. See, e.g., David Moore et al., Effectiveness and Safety of Nicotine Replacement Therapy
Assisted Reduction to Stop Smoking: Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 338 BRIT. MED. J. 867
(2009); Shu-Hong Zhu et aL., Interventions to Increase Smoking Cessation at the Population Level: How
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GSK's chief executive has admitted that e-cigarettes have cut into NRT
213sales. Unsurprisingly, GSK and other NRT manufacturers pushed for greater
regulation of e-cigarettes, in some cases calling for e-cigarettes to be as
214extensively regulated as medical devices. In comments to the FDA, GSK
contended that e-cigarettes are "recreational" and "have not been proven to
help smokers quit." (GSK's products, on the other hand, are described as
"medicine.") 215 GSK urged the FDA to treat e-cigarettes as the equivalent of
cigarettes for regulatory purposes and subject them to the same advertising and
216other restrictions as traditional tobacco products.
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA/
"ObamaCare") provides a financial incentive for smokers to quit and
encourages the use of NRT products as part of smoking cessation efforts.
Whereas the ACA generally prohibits medical underwriting - the practice of
pricing health insurance based upon the insured's health status and other
indicators of expected risk- it allows insurance companies to charge current
smokers as much as 50 percent more for health insurance coverage, unless the
smoker enrolls in an approved smoking cessation program. The imposition of
any such surcharges, however, is conditioned on state approval, and some states
have prohibited or limited the surcharges. In addition, the ACA requires
insurance plans to cover comprehensive smoking cessation treatments as a form
of preventative care. As with the contraception mandate, this coverage must be
offered without cost-sharing by the insured and is meant to include all FDA-
Much Progress Has Been Made in the Last Two Decades?, 21 TOBACCO CONTROL 110 (2012). An
older survey article indicates the low success rate of NRTs. See JR. Hughes et al., A Meta-Analysis of
the Efficacy of Over-the-Counter Nicotine Replacement, 12 TOBACCO CONTROL 21 (2003). For critical
commentary on the usefulness of NRT products, and the active political role played by the
pharmaceutical companies that promote them, see Michael Siegel, THE REST OF THE STORY: TOBACCO
NEWS ANALYSIS & COMMENT., tobaccoanalysis.blogspot.com. See, e.g., Michael Siegel, New Study
Finds No Benefits to Use of Over-the-Counter NRTfor Smoking Cessation, THE REST OF THE STORY
(Oct. 14, 2014, 6:33 AM), http://tobaccoanalysis.blogspot.com/2014/10/new-study-finds-no-benefits-to
-use-of.html; Michael Siegel, Big Pharma Gets its Money's Worth. Study by Pharma-Funded
Researchers Reports Invalid Data to Show that NRT Works When the Correct Study Data Shows No
Effect, THE REST OF THE STORY (Jun. 24, 2013, 6:24 AM),
http://tobaccoanalysis.blogspot.com/2013/06/big-pharma-gets-its-moneys-worth-study.html.
213. Nic Fides, Glaxo Boss Bemoans Rise of 'Vaping,' THE TIMES (Jan. 17, 2015),
http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/business/industries/health/article4325917.ece.
214. See, e.g., Timothy P. Carney, Big Pharma, Not Tobacco Companies, Wages War
on Electronic Cigarettes, WASH. EXAMINER (Nov. 19, 2013), http://washingtonexaminer.com/big-
pharma-not-tobacco-companies-wages-war-on-electronic-cigarettes/article/2539441; Makiko Kitamura,
Glaxo Memo Shows Drug Industry Lobbying on e-Cigarettes, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Feb. 19, 2014),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-19/glaxo-memo-shows-drug-industry-lobbying-on-e
-cigarettes.html.
215. Letter from Erin Oliver, Head, U.S. Regulatory Affairs, GlaxoSmithKline
Consumer Healthcare, to Food & Drug Admin. (Aug. 8, 2014),
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D FDA-2014-N-0189-62796 (concerning the proposed
rule that tobacco products be subject to FDA control).
216. Id.
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approved forms of smoking cessation medications and over-the-counter
NRTs.2 '
Even with the financial incentive for greater NRT use, existing NRT
product makers are threatened by the emergence of e-cigarettes. E-cigarettes
are cutting into NRT product sales.218 Compounding the threat posed by a new
entrant in the NRT market would be evidence that e-cigarettes are more
effective than traditional NRT products at helping smokers quit or reduce
cigarette consumption, as at least one large scale study found. 2 19 Another study
found evidence that e-cigarettes may be superior to traditional NRT for
methadone-maintained smokers.220 Another study found that e-cigarette users
liked the product more than did the users of other NRT products and that there
were fewer withdrawal problems for e-cigarette users. 221 Given such research,
there seems to be good reason for the makers of traditional NRT products to be
concerned about the emergence of e-cigarettes.
C. Bootleggers & Politicians
State governments are Bootleggers in our story as well. But they are not
just run-of-the mill Bootleggers. Their voices are loud and their influence is
deep. They are "a player in the political process who will assist Bootleggers
and Baptists in expanding their regulatory gains. '  Huge amounts of tax
revenues are at stake in regulating e-cigarettes. Tobacco sellers have become
global tax collectors for states and the national governments. Philip Morris
International pays more than sixty percent of its gross revenues to governments
217. FAQs About Affordable Care Act Implementation (Part XX), DEP'T OF LABOR,
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faq-acal9.html ( ast updated May 2, 2014). According to news reports,
coverage of smoking cessation programs, medications, and NRTs has been inconsistent to date. Ferdous
AI-Faruque, Trying to Quit Smoking? Administration Clarifies ObamaCare Rules, THE HILL (May 4,
2014), http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/205090-administration-clarifies-o-care-tobacco-cessation
-requirements.
218. How e-Cigarettes Are Killing the Nicotine Patch Market in Europe, VAPE
RANKS (Jan. 27, 2014), http://vaperanks.com/how-e-cigarettes-are-killing-the-nicotine-patch-market-in
-europe.
219. E-cigarettes may be the most effective NRT, although all work better with
coincident behavioral therapy. A study involving almost 6,000 smokers found e-cigarettes to be
significantly more effective than over-the-counter NRT in producing abstinence from smoking tobacco.
See Jamie Brown et al., Real- World Effectiveness of e-Cigarettes When Used to Aid Smoking Cessation,
109 ADDICTION 1531 (2014).
220. Michael D. Stein et aL., An Open Trial of Electronic Cigarettes for Smoking
Cessation Among Methadone-Maintained Smokers, 18 NICOTINE TOBACCO RES. 1157 (2015).
221. Victoria A. Nelson et al., Comparison of the Characteristics of Long-Term Users
of Electronic Cigarettes Versus Nicotine Replacement Therapy, 153 DRUG ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 300
(Aug. 1, 2015). See also Cristina Russo et al., Evaluation of Post Cessation Weight Gain in a 1-Year
Randomized Smoking Cessation Trial of Electronic Cigarettes, SCI. REP. (2016),
http://www.nature.com/articles/srep18763 (finding evidence use of e-cigarettes may help limit post-
smoking cessation weight gain).
222. Yandle, et al., supra note 39, at 1230.
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223around the world. But consider the critical position of the states. As
discussed earlier, the 1998 MSA established a large and continual flow of
224revenues to the jurisdictions it covered. On the date of the settlement, it was
estimated that a total of $229 billion would be paid to the state treasuries across
the years 1998-2025, although there was no end-point to the stream of
225payments. Payments are to be made annually on April 15. The amount paid
to each state is based on a negotiated formula that reflected individual state
smoking rates, the level of cigarette taxes, Medicaid, and other health care
226expenditures.
For any given year, tobacco company cigarette sales revenues determine
the total allocated to the states. Rising and falling revenues bring variations in
the amounts paid to individual states in a given year. In 2002, MSA payments
to the states were $7 billion. Added to that were state tobacco excise tax
revenues of $9.2 billion. By 2012, MSA payments fell to $6.2 billion, but
227excise revenues were up to $17 billion. This reflected a combination of
factors. First, in an effort to obtain revenues for government operations and to
reduce smoking, states nationwide raised tobacco excise taxes markedly.
Second, the MSA called for higher payments beginning in 2008 and continuing
thereafter. Third, the MSA included an inflation adjustment of three percent
annually or the increase in the CPI, whichever was larger. And fourth is the
effect of the decline in cigarette consumption, which now more than offsets the
annual inflation adjustment. As a result of these forces, total tobacco-related
state revenues appear to have peaked and seem likely to fall further in the
future. Declining revenues raise serious issues regarding payments that must be
made by the states to holders of bonds securitized with tobacco MSA revenues,
a topic we address more fully below.
228
223. Daniel Fisher, Philip Morris International Bets Big on the Future of Smoking,
FORBES (May 28, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2014/05/28/philip-morris
-international-bets-big-on-the- future-of-smoking.
224. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-06-502, TOBACCO SETTLEMENT:
STATES' ALLOCATION OF FISCAL YEAR 2005 AND EXPECTED FISCAL YEAR 2006 (2006),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/250/249651.pdf.
225. Craig L. Johnson et al., Tobacco Securitization and Public Spending, 6 ALBANY
Gov'T L. REV. 21, 22 (2013).
226. Kip Viscusi & Joni Hersch, Tobacco Regulation through Litigation. The MSA
Agreement, in REGULATION VERSUS LITIGATION 71, 78 (Daniel P. Kesler ed., 2011).
227. For tax revenue data, see Tobacco Tax Revenue, TAX POL'Y CTR., URB. INST. &
BROOKINGS INST. (Nov. 24, 2015), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/tobacco-tax-revenue. For
tax revenue information from 2012, see Michigan's Cigarette & Tobacco Taxes, 2012 Statistical
Update, MICHIGAN.GOV,
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/treasury/CigaretteTobaccoTaxes2012StatisticalUpdate 432536 7.
pdf. For data on MSA payments, see Actual Tobacco Settlement Payments Received by the States, 2002-
2014, CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS (Dec. 23, 2014),
http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0365.pdf. MSA payments include less than $100
million annually in total to American Samoa, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and Virgin
Islands. Id.
228. See infra notes 230-245 and accompanying text.
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The MSA did not stipulate how the windfall revenues should be spent.
Health care advocates in state legislative bodies pressed for a significant
amount to be allocated toward smoking cessation programs and other activities
that would help reduce the consumption of cigarettes and other tobacco
products. But support for the health-care position was far from monolithic.
There were other state politicians who simply wanted more revenue for favorite
projects like roads, schools, higher teacher salaries, and improved legislator
pay. The health-care Baptists have been disappointed.
According to CDC studies reported by the Campaign for Tobacco-Free
Kids, "[o]ver the past 15 years, the states have received $390.8 billion in
tobacco-generated revenue-$116.3 billion from the tobacco settlement and
$274.5 billion from tobacco taxes. But they have spent only 2.3 percent of their
tobacco money-$8.9 billion-on tobacco prevention programs.22 9 In fiscal
year 2014, the states collected an estimated $25 billion from the tobacco
settlement and tobacco taxes, but planned to spend only 1.9 percent of it -
$481.2 million - on tobacco prevention and cessation programs. States, now
addicted to cigarette sales revenues, have become regulatory Bootleggers-
they do not wish for tobacco sale revenues to fall and fear the possible impact
of e-cigarettes. Of course, like other regulatory Bootleggers, they must never
speak this publicly.
In the wake of the settlement, some state politicians saw a short-run
opportunity to get control of even more revenue by securitizing all or part of
the MSA cash flow by selling tobacco revenue bonds so they could
immediately spend the present value of the future revenue. This was done in
some cases by establishing a special purpose vehicle, such as a trust or separate
state corporation, created for the specific purpose of issuing and managing the
230tobacco bonds. Selling bonds gave incumbent politicians the opportunity to
dispense largess to benefit their supporters immediately.231 The sale of tobacco
bonds also generated a new group of Bootleggers with intense interest in the
future fortunes of the tobacco companies, their sales, and any competitor that
might carve away part of the tobacco market: the bondholders and the state
agencies that issued the bonds.
Once tobacco bonds were sold, issuing states were not technically liable
for payment to the bondholders, unless they had included in the bonds state
229. Press Release, Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, Fifteen Years after Tobacco
Settlement Report Finds Most States Continue to Shortchange Prevention Programs (Dec. 9, 2013),
http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/press releases/post/2013 12 09 statereport.
230. See Frank Sloan & Lindsey Chepke, Litigation, Settlement, and the Public
Welfare: Lessons from the Master Settlement Agreement, 17 WIDENER L. REV. 159, 219 (2011).
231. What happened with tobacco bond money after the bonds were sold has not
always been consistent with high-minded promises. See Cory Eucalitto, Tobacco Settlement Fund
Gimmicks Alive and Well, ST. BUDGET SOLUTIONS (Apr. 15, 2013),
http://www.statebudgetsolutions.org/publications/detailltobacco-settlement-fund-gimmicks-alive-and
-well.
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232
general fund guarantees, which some states did. However, in the event of a
tobacco company bankruptcy or other payment default, credit markets would
likely still punish a state involved in bond issuance. It seems impossible for a
state to completely separate itself from any debt issue that bears the state's
name. Tobacco bonds were issued by eighteen states and the District of
Columbia, through thirty-four separate bond issues that generated $46
billion. 33 As of 2014, debt outstanding, which includes subsequent issues for
234refinancing old debt, is reported to be $94 billion. Included in the total is a
special bond category called capital appreciation bonds (CABs), which require
low annual payments until maturity when a large balloon payment must be
made. CABs, issued by nine states, the District of Columbia, and a number of
235counties, will require a $64 billion payoff when they mature. Some states
that issued CABs have already experienced reduced credit ratings, based partly
236on declining tobacco revenues, according to a recent assessment.
From 2005 to 2012, the percent of the adult population that smokes fell
23713.4 percent. With cigarette sales falling due to new restrictions on smoking,
higher cigarette taxes, increased health care concerns, and booming e-cigarette
sales, tobacco bondholders have good reason to be more than a bit nervous.238
In May 2014, Moody's indicated that "[f]rom 65 percent to 80 percent of
tobacco securities may fail to pay principal on time as demand for cigarettes
falls short of assumptions.239
The growth of e-cigarettes further threatens tobacco bonds. It should be no
240surprise that there is pressure to revise the MSA to include e-cigarettes.
Longtime Congressional supporters of tobacco regulation have urged states to
232. See Viscusi & Hersch, supra note 226, at 85.
233. Gary Ellis, Analysis of Tobacco Revenue Settlement Bonds: Assessing Cigarette
Consumption Decline Estimates, 13 J. STRUCTURED FIN. 60, 60-62 (2006); Johnson, supra note 225, at
31.
234. Robin Respaut, E-Cigarettes Could Stub Out Tobacco Bonds Sooner Than
Thought, REUTERS (June 24, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/24/us-tobacco-bonds-ecigs
-insight-idUSKBNOEZOCZ20140624.
235. Cezary Podkul, How Wall Street Tobacco Deals Left States with Billions in
Toxic Debt, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.propublica.org/article/how-wall-street-tobacco-
deals-left-states-with-billions-in-toxic-debt.
236. Id.
237. As of 2012, 18.1 percent of the adult population smoked. Current Cigarette
Smoking Among Adults- United States, 2005-2012, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Jan.
17. 2014), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtmllmm6302a2.htm?s cid-mm6302a2 w. A
survey of teens indicates a continued decline in smoking also. See Institute for Soc. Research, Teen
Smoking Continues to Decline in 2013, Annual Survey Shows, UNIV. REC. (Dec. 18, 2013),
http://record.umich.edu/articles/teen-smoking-continues-decline-2013-annual-survey-shows.
238. Aaron Kuriloff, Tobacco Bonds May Feel Heat from e-Cigarettes, WALL ST. J.
(June 24, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/tobacco-bonds-feel-heat-from-e-cigarettes-1403648086.
239. Brian Chappatta, Gross's Tobacco Bond Gain Shows Default Risk Defied,
BLOOMBERG (May 20, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-05-20/gross-s-tobacco-bond-gain
-shows-default-risk-defied-muni-credit.html.
240. See Respaut, supra note 234.
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classify e-cigarettes as tobacco products under the MSA.24 1 According to these
legislators, in letters to twenty-nine AGs, the reason for this is to protect
"America's youth" from e-cigarettes.24 2 They contend that e-cigarettes meet the
definition of "cigarettes" under the MSA because they contain tobacco (insofar
as they contain nicotine derived from tobacco), are "heated under ordinary
conditions of use," and are "likely to be offered to, or purchased by, consumers
as a cigarette.,,24 3 Doing so would bring e-cigarettes under the same cartel-
reinforcing and tax-revenue generating regime as traditional tobacco products,
including limitations on advertising. The Baptists share in this regulatory zeal
in the name of protecting youth. As a legal matter, however, it is not entirely
clear how the MSA could be applied to e-cigarettes or VTM systems that do
not contain nicotine, particularly if not manufactured by a company that is
already subject o the MSA's restrictions.
Tobacco bond trouble has therefore generated a powerful coterie of
Bootleggers who would favor capturing e-cigarette revenues for the MSA
cartel: the state agencies that issued the bonds, the investors holding the bonds,
and the state governments that must trim possible spending. Alternatively, it is
in the interest of state governments and bondholders to suppress the
competitive threat posed by e-cigarettes to traditional cigarettes and to the
source of revenue cigarettes provide. Thus it is not surprising that over two
dozen state AGs have urged the FDA to adopt regulations, such as a prohibition
on the use of flavorings in e-cigarettes, that would make e-cigarettes a less
244attractive alternative to cigarettes for current and former smokers. While
state governments seem to be playing a Bootlegger role, the public may well
see them as Baptists when politicians argue that vital state services that serve
245the public interest are being threatened by e-cigarette sales. Because of this
241. Editorial Board, E-Cigarettes Cloud Progress on Teen Smoking: Our View, USA
TODAY (Dec. 16, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/12/16/e-cigarettes-teen-smoking
-university-of-michigan-editorials-debates/20485297.
242. Press Release, Sen. Dick Durbin, Democratic Leaders Urge FDA Action, Call




244. Elizabeth A. Harris, 29 States Seek Tighter e-Cigarette Regulations, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/09/business/29-states-seek-tighter-e-cigarette-
regulations.html. For a copy of the letter from the attorneys general to the FDA, see Lisa Madigan et al.,
I Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Deeming Tobacco Products to Be Subject to the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (Aug. 8, 2014), available at
http://online.wsj .com/public/resources/documents/fdaletter20140808.pdf.
245. We see a similar dual Bootlegger and Baptist role being played by states under
the 2010 Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking (PACT) Act, with the MSA signatories taking the straight
Bootlegger position. The legislation requires tobacco product shippers to show proof that state excise
taxes have been paid on tobacco products excluding cigars. Prior to PACT, states with high excise taxes
(New York) were losing large amounts of revenue by way of the illegal sale of cigarettes from low tax
states (North Carolina) as well as through Internet sales. Playing Baptists, the states argued that
important public services were put at risk due to the leakage. We argue that the MSA signers, the
straight Bootleggers in our interpretation, were also vitally interested in strengthening their evenue-
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multifaceted performance, we have labeled state governments as possible
televangelists. Indeed, they may be Bootleggers wearing Baptist clothing, or at
least they appear to act that way, and have every incentive to do so.
D. E-Cigarettes & Excise Tax Revenues
Expanding e-cigarette sales provides a second reason for state
governments, along with a few tobacco companies, to enter the "let's regulate
e-cigarettes" discussion. With the exception of Minnesota and North Carolina,
where e-cigarettes are taxed, state revenues fall each time a consumer
substitutes e-cigarettes for regular smokes. The average state excise tax per
cigarette pack is $1.54; in July 2014, state taxes per pack ranged from $0.17 in
246Missouri to $4.35 in New York. Some municipal governments add another
layer of tax. For example, New York City imposes a $1.50 per pack tax. The
247federal government adds an additional $1.01 per pack nationwide. Thus,
cigarette consumers in New York City pay $6.86 per pack in taxes while e-
cigarette consumers pay no excise taxes.248 As of this writing, several bills have
been introduced in Congress that would impose federal excise taxes on e-
cigarettes, but none has been acted upon.249 Because of differences in state and
local excise taxes, the price of a package of Marlboro Reds ranges from a low
of $4.50 in Kentucky to $14.50 in New York City.25° This prompts some actual
bootlegging of cigarettes across state lines to evade the higher excise taxes.
The total of all these taxes and the MSA payments provide substantial
government revenue. According to Reynolds, from 1998 - the time of the
MSA - through 2013, tobacco companies transmitted $528 billion to
251governments at all levels. In fiscal year 2013, taxes collected on cigarettes
included $14.2 billion in federal taxes, $17.1 billion in state and local
government excise taxes, and $4.0 billion in sales taxes. MSA payments that
year totaled $8.5 billion. The keepers of the coffers, kept full by one product
preserving MSA cartel. PACT empowered state AGs, who also police the MSA, to enforce the law,
which passed Congress without a murmur. See Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking Act of 2009 (PACT
Act), Pub. L. No. 111-154, 124 Star. 1087 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and
18 U.S.C.).
246. Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, supra note 229.
247. Id
248. Note that the State of New York mandates minimum cigarette prices in the state
and in New York City. See Minimum Wholesale and Retail Cigarette Prices, Pub. 509, N.Y. ST. DEP'T
OF TAX'N & FIN., (Nov. 2015), http://www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/publications/cigarette/pub509.pdf.
249. Alex Brill & Alan D. Viard, A Tax on Public Health, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.
(May 18, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/economic-intelligence/2014/05/08/dont-tax-e
-cigarettes-like-tobacco-products.
250. Stephen Perlberg, Here's Why a Pack of Cigarettes Is So Darn Expensive in New
York, Bus. INSIDER (Feb. 5, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/cigarette-excise-tax-by-state-2014
-2.
251. See Tobacco Taxes & Payments, TRANSFORM TOBACCO, REYNOLDS AMERICAN
INC., http://www.transformtobacco.com/Pages/TaxFacts.aspx.
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used by a falling fraction of the population, are understandably nervous about
the certainty of their cash flows.
252
Now consider consumers. For them, tax-free e-cigarettes are all the more
attractive. Not only do they offer a less health-damaging alternative to
traditional cigarettes, they are also less expensive. A back-of-envelope analysis
illustrates.253 Given the variation in cigarette prices, a pack-a-day smoker can
spend from $1,500 in Missouri to $5,000 in New York City annually. On
average, across the states, cigarette smokers spend $2,250 annually. One
researcher found that "[m]ost disposable e-cigarettes say they're equivalent to
about 2 packs of cigarettes and cost $6 to $10 apiece, meaning they'd cost
,254about $1,100 to $1,800 a year." Using the author's larger estimate, the
savings would be small in Missouri, but as much as $3,200 a year in New York
City. The savings are even larger for rechargeable e-cigarettes and cartridges.
With this product, the initial cost is $10 to $35. Cartridges cost $2.50 each. This
translates into savings of $1,800 annually when compared to the average cost
of smoking across all states. As median household income is about $51,000,
255this would mean a 3.5 percent saving in gross income.
Jim Craig, an e-cigarette user in Salt Lake City, told a reporter:
"Cigarettes were getting horribly expensive .... I've thrown endless thousands
of dollars away.25 6 Craig was spending $200 a month on cigarettes. He now
spends $45 a month on e-cigarettes. These immediate financial benefits do not
take into account the gains from reduced health hazards, reduced social
opprobrium from switching away from traditional cigarette smoking, and
reduced concerns smokers may have about secondhand smoke issues.
As noted, states are looking to tax e-cigarettes. In Minnesota, e-cigarettes
are taxed as tobacco products and carry a ninety-five percent tax on their
wholesale cost.2 57 Lawmakers in more than a score of states are joining the hunt
for revenue.25 8 Those opposing taxation point out that incentives matter.
Increasing the cost of e-cigarettes will discourage those who might beneficially
switch away from harmful tobacco products. Such critics are joined by small
retailers and vapor shop operators who make a "we just want to stay in
252. See Tax Facts - History, TRANSFORM TOBACCO, REYNOLDS AMERICAN, INC.,
http://www.transformtobacco.com/Pages/TaxHistory.aspx.
253. Michael Felberbaum, For Smokers, Can E-Cigarettes Save Money?, COLUMBUS
CEO (June 30, 2014), http://www.columbusceo.com/content/stories/apexchange/2014/06/30/us-smart
-spending-electronic-cigarettes.html.
254. Id
255. However, smokers have, on average, lower income than the national average so
the savings as a share of income are greater. See Amanda Noss, Household Income: 2012, CENSUS
BUREAU (Sept. 2013), http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/acsbrl2-02.pdf.
256. Felberbaum, supra note 253.
257. See E-Cigarettes, MINN. DEP'T OF REVENUE (July 2015),
http://www.revenue. state.mn.us/businesses/tobacco/Pages/e-Cig.aspx.
258. Barnini Chakraborty, States Push to Regulate, Tax Booming E-Cigarette
Industry, Fox NEWS (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/03/18/states-push-to
-regulate-tax-booming-e-cigarette-industry.
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business" appeal, pointing out that high taxes could drive away their customers
and shut them down. A recent Washington state e-cigarette tax initiative failed.
It would have defined vapor products as tobacco substitutes, making them
subject to a ninety-five percent tax expected to produce $40 million in
additional revenue. While not yet taxing e-cigarettes, Utah, North Dakota, and
the District of Columbia have made e-cigarettes ubject to their indoor-smoking
ban, arguing that e-cigarettes should be regulated like other tobacco
259products.
Just how e-cigarettes will be taxed and regulated is a high stakes question.
With e-cigarette sales volume increasing - mostly at the expense of traditional
cigarettes - the MSA-burdened tobacco companies are conflicted. They may
desire to hold down the price of e-cigarettes for themselves, but they also may
wish to put a price squeeze on their e-cigarette competitors. After all, the large
tobacco companies will be selling e-cigarettes and would benefit from low
prices. At the same time, the dominant firms might welcome having all e-
cigarette sellers participate in the MSA to prevent having to face an even
heavier MSA burden alone. Keeping excise taxes lower would mean larger e-
cigarette revenues, which could supplement the MSA kitty.
Reynolds's lobbying efforts illustrate the point. When North Carolina's
legislature was debating a bill to tax and regulate e-cigarettes, Reynolds lobbied
in favor of the bill. 26° In a February 2013 meeting in Washington, D.C.,
Reynolds met with various nonprofit groups and e-cigarette advocates.
According to reports on the meeting, Reynolds announced a strategy to avoid
the most severe regulatory restrictions. The company instructed their lobbyist
to support taxing e-cigarettes across the states, but at a lower level than
traditional cigarettes.26 1 Reynolds argued that placing a tax on e-cigarettes
would cause them to be viewed as a legitimate product; in other words, the
product would become politically valuable and thus an asset to be used in
forging future political agreements.
Greg Conley, then the legislative director for Consumer Advocates for
Smoke-Free Alternatives Association (now president of the American Vaping
Association) participated in the D.C. meeting with Reynolds. Conley indicated
that "[w]hen Reynolds enters the market with e-cigarettes, they already have
established relationships" that will give them a distribution advantage over their
262small e-cigarette competitors. This advantage can be significant. Reynolds'
Vuse achieved substantial market share within weeks of its introduction into
259. Id
260. Matthew Bandyk, Tobacco Stubs out E-Cigarette Competitors, DAILY CALLER
(Apr. 6, 2013), http://dailycaller.com/2012/04/06/big-tobacco-stubs-oput-e-cigarette-competitors.
261. Id.
262. Id. Conley discussed Reynolds's strategy further in Gregory Conley, Big
Tobacco's War on Vaping, NAT'L REV. ONLINE (Jan. 16, 2015, 4:00 AM),
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/396466/big-tobaccos-war-vaping-gregory-conley.
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263
select markets. The imposition of additional regulatory requirements on e-
cigarette manufacturers is likely to further enhance the competitive strength of
the Big 2.
In sum, as we look across the e-cigarette regulatory landscape, we see
Bootleggers and Baptists jumping on the issue from different perspectives and
interests. Among those easy to identify are state politician Bootleggers and
televangelists who appear to be concerned about tobacco bond revenues but
speak like Baptists when they cloak their revenue needs in a public interest
appeal. They act as if they are concerned about lost MSA revenues that will
occur as consumers switch from traditional cigarettes to e-cigarettes, and have
every incentive to do so. The result could be greater state budget difficulties as
tobacco revenues fall. Predictably, these same Bootleggers are looking for ways
to classify e-cigarettes that do not contain tobacco as tobacco products so they
can be taxed like cigarettes. Nearby are holders of tobacco bonds who are
seeing degraded bond ratings and lost market value. The directors of the state
agencies that issued those bonds are worried, too. Even though, in most cases,
they bear no recourse liability, they know that a default on the tobacco bonds
they issued could put an ugly credit rating bruise on future state bond issues.
Then, there are some Bootleggers, like Reynolds, that have seen the
handwriting on the wall. They are acting as though they hope to reduce
dramatically the fortunes of e-cigarette producers by supporting favorable
forms of Baptist-preferred regulation and taxation. Reynolds is harmonizing in
the back row of the Baptist choir.
Conclusion
Cigarette makers, through the MSA and federal regulation, live in a highly
taxed, regulated, and cartelized industry. Their cozy cartel has not been
contested by new competition for years. But now they face competition from
upstart e-cigarette companies, as the primary market for e-cigarettes is current
cigarette smokers. Incumbents do not relish change, though there is no doubt
that Big Tobacco is well positioned to move into e-cigarettes, as they have been
doing, and are likely to do just fine in that market. But the story is more
complicated than that. This is not just a matter of existing firms adapting to
new technology or facing the prospect of withering away. Instead, the story is
about influencing the next set of regulatory constraints to be faced by future
industry players.
The Bootleggers and Baptists of the e-cigarette story look beyond
competition between traditional cigarettes and e-cigarettes - they seek to
influence the future regulatory environment within which e-cigarette producers
will operate. The Baptists are public and private health advocates who are
opposed to cigarettes and have expressed similar hostility to e-cigarettes. It is a
263. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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somewhat fractured group, as a dissenting but distinct minority of health
advocates believes that, properly regulated, e-cigarettes provide a realistic way
to reduce dependence on traditional cigarettes and thereby reduce the primary
health hazards posed by smoking cigarettes. As is often the case, the Baptists
provide political cover for the Bootleggers who have real money on the line,
not just high ideals about what is supposed to be good for people.
Bootleggers who wear Baptist clothing are the NRT makers, such as
Nicorette's producer GSK, who are favored by federal health law. They are
concerned that the sale of their products could take a direct hit as former
smokers switch from such products to e-cigarettes. They have no interest in
welcoming e-cigarette makers into the NRT club.
The traditional cigarette industry cartel and the key parties who benefit
from the current structure are threatened by the rapid emergence of outside e-
cigarette firms. The major tobacco companies are responding to the upstarts
with e-cigarette products of their own. Their marketing and distribution
expertise empower them to counter the threat from the initial e-cigarette
innovators, particularly if regulatory measures increase the costs of entry into
the market and create barriers for smaller, less-capitalized firms with less
developed marketing and distribution networks. But while the cigarette
companies can respond and gain e-cigarette revenues by doing so, the revenue
they produce for MSA payments is reduced each time a traditional cigarette
smoker switches to an e-cigarette. This creates another group of potential
Bootleggers-states and bondholders.
States are facing declining tax revenue from traditional cigarettes and,
similarly disturbing, are facing the possibility of default on tobacco bonds.
States do not relish tarnished fiscal reputations and bondholders have no
interest in suffering losses. The declining revenue problem caused by the
decline in traditional cigarette sales threatens politically important parties who
are highly organized. The addition of the states and the tobacco bondholders
operating in the shadow of the MSA enriches the Bootlegger/Baptist model and
illuminates the e-cigarette struggle far better than has been the case for past
tobacco industry struggles. For example, past regulatory episodes involved
public health advocates who favored a reduction in advertising and marketing
strategies that targeted younger smokers. These advocates were accommodated
by cigarette producers who wanted to reduce advertising expenditures and limit
the entry of new competition. Regulatory successes brought some satisfaction
to both groups and often set the stage for the next regulatory battle. This
struggle ended when the attorneys general negotiated the MSA. This yielded
what was thought to be the ultimate regulatory cartel. The rise of e-cigarettes
threatens the cartel and arouses a three-pronged response from health
advocates, Big Tobacco, and state governments and their tobacco bond holders.
Because of this rich reaction and the size of the stakes, the status quo cannot
survive. A new regulatory environment will evolve, turning threats into
opportunities for some and creating a new institutional environment for others.
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The question is whether this new regulatory environment will enhance public
welfare, or merely serve the interests of Bootleggers.
There is an obvious irony here. To the extent that e-cigarettes provide a
less hazardous alternative to consumers who seek to break their smoking habit,
Bootlegger/Baptist induced regulations that limit e-cigarette competition and
evolution bring with them a social cost measured in lost opportunities to
improve human health. Given that nearly 500,000 people in the United States• . •264
die from smoking-related illnesses each year, the cost could be significant.
Going further, regulatory actions that limit e-cigarette marketability chill
development of yet-to-be-tested smoking alternatives that might also threaten
the market share of traditional tobacco and smoking cessation products. As Dr.
David Abrams recently warned in the Journal of the American Medical
Association: the adoption of "overly restrictive" regulations of e-cigarettes
could "support the established tobacco industry" and have the perverse effect of
"perpetuat[ing] the sales of conventional cigarettes well into the next century
1 • ,,265
rather than speed their obsolescence.
Vested interests always oppose innovations that threaten the status quo.
Maintaining the status quo through regulatory restrictions, however, is not
always in the public interest, and in this case might come at the expense of
public health.
264. Tobacco-Related Mortality, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Feb.
6, 2014),
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data statistics/fact sheets/health effects/tobacco related mortality.
265. See Abrams, supra note 115, at 136; see also Saitta, et al., supra note 114, at 57
("[E]-cigarettes are not a gateway to smoking but a gateway from smoking, and heavy regulation by
restricting access to e-cigarettes would just encourage continuing use of much unhealthier tobacco
smoking.").

